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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
:

v.

:

DYAN LYNN MARTINEZ,

:

Case No. 20001063-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for Workers Compensation Insurance Fraud, a
second degree felony, and attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court properly order restitution where the crime to which
defendant pleaded guilty caused WCF to pay for medication it would
not have otherwise paid for?
"An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's restitution order "unless it

exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion/" State v. Breeze.
2001 UT App 200, ^ 5, 29 P.3d 19 (citations omitted). However, if the claim involves a
question of statutory interpretation, this Court "reviewfs] the trial court's interpretation

of a statute for correctness and accord[s] no deference to its conclusions of law." State
v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
II.

Did the trial court commit plain error in relying on unchallenged
hearsay contained in defendant's PSI where Utah courts have
universally assumed PSIs are reliable?
To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) an error occurred; (2) the

error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) she would have obtained a more
favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
III.

Does evidence that defendant's conduct caused WCF to pay for
medication it would not have otherwise paid for support the trial
court's restitution order?
'To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence [supporting a restitution

order], appellant 'must demonstrate that the clear weight of [the] evidence contradicts the
trial court's verdict.'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting
State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995)).
IV.

Did the trial court err in failing to make specific findings on the PSI
issues explicitly raised in defendant's brief where the first issue did not
involve the PSI and the court addressed the second?
"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty is a question of law

that we review for correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 13, 6 P.3d 1133.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are attached at Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged with one count of Workers' Compensation
Insurance Fraud, one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance [Oxycontin]
with intent to distribute, and two counts of obtaining a controlled substance [Oxycontin]
by fraud (R. 3-4). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to the first
count as charged and to an amended second count charging attempted distribution of
methamphetamine; the State agreed to dismiss the other charges (R. 38; R. 90:2-3, 12).
The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of one to fifteen years on the
fraud conviction and zero to five years on the distribution conviction (R. 91). The court
then suspended the sentences and ordered defendant to serve 60 days in jail, complete 48
months of probation, and pay restitution in the amount of S 14,647 (R. 92-93). Defendant
timely appealed (R. 64).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
In 1991, defendant injured her back while working at Olsen's Greenhouse Gardens
(R. 5; R. 61:2). In 1994, as a result of this injury, defendant represented to the Utah
Industrial Commission that she was permanently totally disabled (R. 5; R. 61:2).
Worker's Compensation Fund ("WCF") agreed to continue to pay any medical expenses
resulting from the injury (R. 5; R. 61:2). As part of this agreement, WCF paid
defendant's bills for prescription drugs, totaling $16,152.41 (R. 5; R. 61:2). The bulk of
these bills ($14,647) was attributable to Oxycontin, an opiate pain reliever and controlled
substance ((R. 5; R. 61:2; R. 77:18).
While receiving benefits from WCF because of her permanent total disability,
defendant began working 25 to 30 hours a week in a cafeteria at Salt Lake Community
College under the assumed name of Deborah Lee Hardy (R. 5, 39; R. 61:2-3; R. 90:7).
Her responsibilities included "lifting 20 pound buckets of ice at least twice a day, four to
six hours of standing as a cashier, and cooking" (R. 61:3). Her supervisor reported that
defendant did not appear to have any difficulty performing her duties (R. 61:3).
Defendant did not report her employment to her treating physician, Dr. Dall, or her WCF
claims adjuster (Id.).

'Because defendant pleaded guilty to the charges before a preliminary hearing
was held, the facts are taken from the probable cause statement supporting the
information, the plea hearing, and defendant's presentence investigation report.
4

Despite her new employment, defendant continued to receive Oxycontin.
Defendant represented to Dr. Dall that her back pain was so severe that she "was unable
to function without continuous pain medication1' (R. 61:3). According to defendant's
PSI, WCF would not have paid for defendant's Oxycontin if it had known she was
employed (R. 61:4; R. 77:9-10). Dr. Dall concurred that if defendant had been truthful,
he would not have prescribed Oxycontin (R. 61:3-4).
On September 5, 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to Worker's Compensation
Insurance Fraud and Attempted Distribution of Methamphetamine (R. 38; R. 90:2-3, 12).
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss two other counts that charged
defendant with obtaining a controlled substance, Oxycontin, by fraud (R. 4, 38).
At sentencing, the State conceded that WCF was required to pay for some
medication for defendant (R. 77:9). However, the State argued that defendant should pay
restitution for the difference in cost between the Oxycontin and methadone, a cheaper
drug often prescribed as an Oxycontin substitute (R. 77:8-11). When defendant objected
to methadone as the substitute, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the
full amount of the Oxycontin prescribed, $14,647 (R. 92).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Under Utah's restitution statute, a trial court must impose restitution for

any damages resulting from a defendant's criminal conduct. Here, defendant admitted
that she intentionally obtained benefits from WCF under false pretenses by working

5

under an assumed name while receiving benefits for being unemplovable. Because one
of those benefits was payment for medication WCF would not have paid for if it had
known defendant was working, the trial court properly ordered restitution in this case.
II.

To succeed on her unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly relied

on double and triple hearsay contained in her PSI, defendant must show that an error
occurred, that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error
harmed her. Defendant cannot do that here. Because the preparer of a PSI inevitably
relies on third parties for information, a PSI always contains at least double hearsay.
Yet, Utah case law has consistently held that a trial court may properly consider
information contained in a PSI report so long as defendant is given the opportunity to
challenge that information at sentencing. Indeed, State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah
1993)—the case on which defendant's claim heavily rests—relies on information in a
PSI. Thus, defendant cannot demonstrate that any error, let alone plain error, occurred.
III.

Evidence that WCF would not have paid for defendant's Oxycontin if it

had known she was well enough to work supports the trial court's restitution order.
Thus, defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim fails.
IV.

Utah courts are entitled to have the issues clearly defined on appeal. Here,

defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to address objections to her PSI on
the record. However, in support of her claim, defendant makes several conclusory
statements which, neither alone nor in conjunction with the record cites she supplies,

6

adequateK identity the alleged objections she now claims should have been addressed.
Because this part of her claim is inadequately briefed, this Court should refuse to
consider it. Concerning the two issues defendant does adequately identify in her brief.
both fail on the merits. The first issue, which addresses evidence outside of the PSI
more than evidence inside it, was not raised clearly enough below to alert the trial court
that action was warranted. The second issue was addressed by the trial court on the
record.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED RESTITUTION
WHERE THE CRIME TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLEADED
GUILTY CAUSED WCF PECUNIARY DAMAGES
Defendant claims that the "sentencing court misapplied the restitution statute" by

imposing restitution for conduct for which she "was not convicted, did not plead guilty,
and did not admit responsibility." Aplt. Br. at 12. Specifically, defendant claims that
restitution for the cost of Oxycontin was improper because "the only charges that were
related to Oxycontin were dismissed in exchange for her guilty plea." Aplt. Br. at 16.
Defendant's claim is without merit.
This Court "will not disturb a trial court's restitution order 'unless it exceeds that
prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion/" State v. Breeze. 2001 UT App
200, •} 5. 29 P.3d 19 (citations omitted). However, when the claim involves a question
of statutory interpretation, this Court "reviewfs] the trial court's interpretation of a
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statute for correctness and accord[s] no deference to its conclusions of law." State v.
Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, . . . the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims of
crime as provided in this subsection." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). "Criminal
activities" is defined in section 76-3-201(1 )(b) as "any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to
the sentencing court." Id. § 76-3-201(l)(b); see also State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,
f 3, 987 P.2d 1289. Under this section, if "it is clear that but for [defendant's admitted]
criminal act," the victim's loss would not have occurred, the court must order defendant
to make restitution to that victim. State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah App. 1997)
Here, defendant pleaded guilty to "obtaining] workers compensation benefits by
working under an assumed name while receiving benefits for being unemployable" (R.
39; Addendum B). Although defendant never admitted that WCF's payment for her
Oxycontin medication was one of those benefits, the record clearly establishes that it
was. Cf. McBride. 940 P.2d at 544 (holding defendant convicted of joyriding was
properly ordered to pay restitution to owner where car was impounded and then, due to
police oversight, subsequently sold). According to defendant's PSI, WCF would not
have paid for defendant's Oxycontin "had they known of defendant["s] gainful
employment under the assumed name" (R. 61:4; Addendum B). The PSI also indicated
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that, **[o]n March 1, 1999, Dr. Dall told WCF investigator McDonald that if he had
known that defendant. . . was gainfully employed under an alias. . . . he would not have
prescribed Oxycontin for [her]v (R. 61:3-4; Addendum C D). Finally, a status report
from Dr. Dall dated May 31, 2000 indicated that, because "narcotic medications [like
Oxycontin] have been disallowed for this lady" due to her criminal conduct. Dr. Dall did
in fact—as the PSI suggested he would—stop prescribing defendant Oxycontin (R. 50:
Addendum D).
This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings that defendant
"would not have received Oxycontin at all had she been forthright and had she been not
engaging in her fraudulent activities'* (R. 77:16: Addendum E). Therefore, the trial
court properly ordered defendant to pay restitution "for the medication she never should
have obtained but for her lying, conniving, cheating conduct" (R. 77:17; Addendum E).
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4); McBride. 940 P.2d at 544 (holding that restitution is
properly ordered where "it is clear that but for [defendant's] criminal act," the damages
would not have occurred).
State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289, on which defendant relies, see
Aplt. Br. at 14-15., is inapposite. In Watson, the defendant was originally charged with
criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, and obstruction of justice because she
allegedly drove co-defendants to and from a scene where the co-defendants killed one
person and injured another, and then she sold the car in which she had driven them.
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Watson. 1999 UT App 273, at <| 2. The murder and attempted murder charges against
Watson were subsequently dismissed when she agreed to plead guilty to attempted
obstruction of justice. Id. Despite never accepting responsibility for the other crimes or
otherwise agreeing to pay restitution for them, defendant was nonetheless ordered to pay
restitution for damages relating to the murder. Id. at If 4. This Court held that such a
restitution order was improper under section 76-3-201. Id. at 1} 6.
In contrast to Watson, defendant here pleaded guilty to the exact conduct that
caused WCF pecuniary damages. Specifically, defendant admitted to "obtaining]
workers compensation benefits by working under an assumed name while receiving
benefits for being unemployable" (R. 39; Addendum B). One of those benefits was
WCFs payment for Oxycontin (R. 5; R. 61:3-4; R. 77:9-10). Because the trial court
here only ordered defendant to pay restitution for the pecuniary damages specifically
caused by her admitted conduct, Watson does not apply.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
RELYING ON UNCHALLENGED HEARSAY IN DEFENDANT'S
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
Defendant claims that the "sentencing court erred and violated [her] due process

rights when it relied almost exclusively upon double and triple hearsay in determining
the amount of restitution." Aplt. Br. at 19. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial
court improperly relied on the presentence investigation report, "which is itself hearsay.

10

contains statements made by the WCF imestigation both those made b> himself, which
amount to double hearsay, and those made by Dr. Dall to the WCF investigator, which
are triple hearsay." Aplt. Br. at 20.
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, she asks this Court to review it
for plain error. To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error
occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) defendant
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Here, defendant claims the trial court committed plain error under State v.
Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993). because it relied on the PSI that contained double
and triple hearsay. According to defendant, Johnson held that such hearsay is
necessarily unreliable and that a trial court therefore always errs in relying on such
hearsay at sentencing. Such a reading of Johnson, however, would necessarily render
consideration of any PSI at sentencing plain error. Johnson does not reach that far.
A.

The general rule is that PSI's, although at least double hearsay,
are admissible at sentencing.

'"The due process clause in both the United States and Utah Constitutions
''requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.

State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah

App. 1997) (quoting State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064. 1071 (Utah 1993) (quoting State
v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985))): see also State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853. 854
11

(Utah 1994). At the same time, however, because the objective at sentencing is to
determine the most appropriate penalty for each individual defendant, a sentencing court
""must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably may bear on the
proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed/" State v.
Sanwick. 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986) (quoting Wasman v. United States. 468 U.S.
559. 563 (1984)); see also Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
To balance these potentially competing principles, courts have concluded that
'"the rules of evidence in general, and the rules on hearsay exceptions in particular, are
inapplicable in sentencing proceedings/' Sanwick. 713 P.2d at 709; see also State v.
McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1997); Utah R. Evid. 1101 (providing that rules
of evidence do not apply at sentencing). However, due process and ^fundamental
principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have the right to
examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon
which [his or her] sentence is based/" Patience, 944 P.2d at 389 (quoting State v.
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994)). Accordingly, ~[h]earsay [is] admissible as
long as the defendant [has] the opportunity to rebut the adverse evidence and to
challenge the reliability of the evidence presented/' Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 709; Patience.
944P.2dat389.
Consistent with these rules, Utah law provides that prior to imposing sentence,
"the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for [sentencing]
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for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report." Id. § 77-18-1(5) (1999).
This report is provided to "assist the courts in sentencing." id. § 64-13-20( l)(a)(k). and
shall include consideration "of the social, physical, and mental conditions and
backgrounds of offenders," id. § 64-13-20(10(a)(i), (1 )(c)(i). It "shall" also include "a
victim impact statement" and "a specific statement of pecuniary damages." Id. § 77-181(5). A copy of the report must then be provided to defendant or her counsel at least
three working days before sentencing. Id. § 77-18-1(6).
As defendant's PSI exemplifies, the majority of the information contained in a
PSI is gathered from third party sources. See, e.g., R. 61 (noting sources as "Court
dockets and District Attorney file"; "The defendant": "Contact with Larry McDonald of
the WCF"; "Documentation provided by the Salt Lake County Jail": "Utah State
Juvenile Court records": "Contact with Eric Anderson of the United States Probation
Office": "Salt Lake City Gang Area Project records"); Addendum C.
Thus. "*[b]y the very nature of a presentence investigation report, it is necessary
to rely to a great extent upon hearsay information/" State v. Ritsch, 440 N.W.2d 689,
691 (Neb. 1989)(citation omitted); see also State v. Sims. 887 P.2d 72, 80 (Kan. 1994)
("Information required to be included in a presentence investigation report necessarily
includes hearsay/').
Nonetheless, "[ujnder the practice of individualizing punishments, investigation
techniques have been given an important role." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
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249 (1949). Thus, presentence investigation reports have become "a valuable
sentencing aid/" Williams v. State. 601 So. 2d 1062, 1085 (Ala. Crim. Ct. 1992)
(citation omitted), affd without opinion. 662 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1992). and the probation
officers who prepare them, "a valuable resource to judges/" State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d
853, 855 (Utah 1994). "To deprive sentencing judges of [the] kind of information
[contained in such reports] would undermine modern penological procedural policies
that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and
experimentation/' Williams. 337 U.S. at 249-50. Moreover. "[t]he type and extent of
this information make totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with
cross-examination/* Id. at 250. Such considerations "admonish [this Court] against
treating the due-process clause as a uniform command that courts throughout the Nation
abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to
guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence." Williams, 337 U.S.
at 250: see also State v. Sims, 887 P.2d 72, 80 (Kan. 1994) (holding strict application of
evidentiary rules at sentencing "would deprive the court of the information necessary to
fulfill its responsibilities").
Consequently, Utah courts have consistently held that, unless "the accuracy of a
report is contested," "we must presume that reports prepared by professional probation
officers . . . are generally reliable/' Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977). See
State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994) (rejecting defendant's due process claim

14

where defendant was provided copy of PSI before sentencing, had an opportunity to
examine the report and challenge its contents, and failed to avail himself of that
opportunity): State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115. 118 (Utah 1985) (holding defendant must
be supplied copy of presentence report to effectuate requirement that judge act on
reasonably reliable and relevant information in fixing sentence); State v. Anderson. 632
P.2d 877. 878-79 (Utah 1981) (holding court did not err in considering information in
PSI where it "[was] disclosed to the defendant who made no objection"); State v. Lipsky.
608 P.2d 1241. 1242 (Utah 1980) (holding "trial court may receive information
concerning the defendant in the form of a pre-sentence report" as long as report is
"disclosed to the defendant" and he has "the opportunity to bring . . . inaccuracies to the
court's attention"); State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Utah App. 1991) (holding
defendant's due process rights are protected where defendant receives presentence
report in time to effectively contest any perceived inaccuracies).
B.

Johnson does not alter this rule.

In State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), Johnson, after being convicted
for various sex crimes involving the same child, challenged the trial court's reliance at
sentencing on hearsay evidence that he had abused another victim. Johnson claimed that
the evidence—which was not contained in a PSI but, rather, in a sexual abuse center's
report and various other documents—was unreliable double and triple hearsay and that
the trial court therefore violated his due process rights by relying on it. Id. at 1070-71.
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After reciting the above stated principles, the supreme court agreed with Johnson.
Because "[n]ot only did the report consist almost entirely of double and triple hearsay,
but also the hearsay statements contained numerous internal inconsistencies and
speculative conclusions based on incomplete information and questionable factual
assumptions," the trial court erred in relying thereon. Id. at 1071-72.
Although it is true, as defendant notes, that Johnson states at one point that
"double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for
inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing," Johnson, at 1071. that
statement has never been literally applied, especially to PSIs. As noted above, cases
both before and after Johnson assume that, absent a defendant's specific objection, PSIs
are reliable. See State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, If 34, 999 P.2d 7 (holding trial court has
duty to resolve alleged inaccuracies where defendant "objected to the presentence report
prepared in this case"): State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, «flf 42~45> 9 7 3 p - 2 d
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(same);

Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855; Howell, 707 P.2d at 118; Anderson. 632 P.2d at 878-79; Lipsky.
608 P.2d at 1242; Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1050-51.
Moreover, Johnson itself relies on information in the defendant's PSI in support
of his appeal. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1073, 1074. In addition, it cites approvingly to
Lipsky, see Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1073, which expressly held that a "trial court may
receive information concerning the defendant in the form of a pre-sentence report" so
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long as the report is "disclosed to the defendant" and he has "the opportunity to bring . .
. inaccuracies to the court's attention." Lipsky\ 608 P.2d at 878-79.
Thus, a reasonable interpretation of Johnson is that a trial court cannot rely on
double or triple hearsay at sentencing where the defendant expressly challenges that
hearsay and the hearsay on its face lacks sufficient indicia of reliability. See Johnson.
856 P.2d at 1072-73; State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997) (describing
Johnson as holding that "report trial court relied on was inherently unreliable because it
consisted of double and triple hearsay and 'contained numerous internal consistencies
and speculative conclusions based on incomplete information and questionable factual
assumptions'"); State ex rel W.S.. 939 P.2d 196, 201 (Utah App. 1997) (applying
Johnson to parental termination case where "appellant objected repeatedly" to
admission of pre-disposition report "because the caseworker . . . had no personal
knowledge of the CPS investigations cited in the report" and where trial court did not
allow appellant to testify "to rebut incidents cited in the pre-disposition report''). Absent
objection, then, a trial court does not err under Johnson in assuming that a PSI is
reliable.2

2

The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 631
(9 Cir. 1971), cited by defendant and relied upon in Johnson, lends further support for
this interpretation. In Weston, defendant "vigorously denied the accuracy of [other
charges in the PSI] and objected to the judge's consideration of them without more
substantiation of them than appeared in the probation report." Because "the other
criminal conduct charged was very serious, and the factual basis for believing the charge
was almost nil," the Ninth Circuit agreed that the trial court erred in considering the
th
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C.

Because no established appellate law renders PSIs inadmissible at
sentencing, defendant's plain error claim fails.

As stated above, to show plain error, defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error
occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) defendant
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). However, an error is not obvious "where there is no settled
appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross* 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App.
1997) (citing State v. Eldredge* 113 P.2d 29. 35-36 (Utah 1989); State v. Braim, 787
P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah App. 1990)).
Here, defendant cannot establish that any error, let alone obvious error, occurred
in the trial court's reliance on unchallenged hearsay in her PSI. Johnson—the major
case on which defendant relies—not only cites to information in defendant's PSI to
support his appeal but also cites approvingly to a case that specifically held PSIs are
admissible as long as they are subject to the defendant's challenge. See Johnson* 856
P.2d at 1071 (citing Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)); Id. at 1073-74 (citing PSI).

challenged evidence. Id. at 633.
Since then, however, the Ninth Circuit has determined that "Weston was decided
under unique circumstances . . . because of the inherent difficulty for the defendant to
prove or disprove the [charges] made against her in the presentence report." United
States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1267 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, Weston has been interpreted
to hold only "that when allegations included in a presentence report are not within the
defendant's power to meaningfully refute and are based on only the barest factual
foundation, then the district judge cannot in fairness consider them." Id.\ Charlesworth*
217 F.3d at 1160-61; United States v. Branco* 798 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1986).
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In addition, all other Utah case law follows Lipskyrs rule. See, e.g., KohL 2000 UT 35.
at«[ 34: Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, at «fl[ 42-45: Gomez. 887 P.2d at 855: HowelL 707 P.2d at
118: Anderson. 632 P.2d at 878-79: Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1050-51.
Consequently, defendant has not established that the trial court committed error.
let alone plain error, in relying on unchallenged information in her PSI. Thus,
defendant's plain error claim fails.
HI.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER WAS PROPER
WHERE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CAUSED WCF TO PAY FOR
MEDICATION IT WOULD NOT HAVE OTHERWISE PAID FOR
Defendant claims that the evidence, "fully marshaled and regarded in the light

most favorable to the sentencing court's determination, does not establish either that
[her] admitted criminal acts were the 'but for' cause of pecuniary damages or that
Methadone was a proper medication in lieu of Oxycontin." Aplt. Br. at 22.
A trial court's factual findings will be reversed only if they are against the clear
weight of the evidence. State ex rel. LM9 2001 UT App 314,1j 14, 433 Utah Adv. Rep.
6; State v. Andreason. 2001 UT App 395, f 4 n. 3,
A.

Utah Adv. Rep.

.

The evidence supports a "but for" connection between
defendant's admitted conduct and WCF's pecuniary damages.

Defendant claims that the evidence "does not establish . . . that [her] admitted
criminal acts were the 'but for' cause of pecuniary damages." Aplt. Br. at 22. See State
v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that restitution is proper
where loss would not have occurred but for defendant's criminal conduct).
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In support of her argument, defendant marshals evidence (1) that Dr. Dall
originally prescribed Oxycontin for defendant and that WCF originally paid for
Oxycontin as part of defendant's permanent total disability benefits; (2) that during this
same time, defendant worked part-time at a community college cafeteria under an
assumed name; and (3) that, according to defendant's PSL Dr. Dall would not have
prescribed Oxycontin for defendant and WCF would not have paid for Oxycontin for
defendant if they had known that she was employed. Aplt. Br. at 24.
Defendant then claims that this evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's
"but for" finding because it is "directly contradicted by reliable evidence" (1) that
defendant "was entitled to receive medical benefits regardless of any misconduct" and
that "Oxycontin had been determined to be the appropriate medication," Aplt. Br. at 2425. and (2) that "Dr. Dall would have continued to prescribe Oxycontin even had he
known of [her] admitted misconduct of working under an assumed name." Aplt. Br. at
25. Neither of defendant's contentions survives scrutiny.
First, defendant does not show why her entitlement to receive medical benefits
regardless of any misconduct necessarily equates to an entitlement to the specific
narcotic Oxycontin. The fact that Dr. Dall prescribed Oxycontin for defendant after she
fraudulently represented to him that "she was unable to function without continuous
pain medication" (R. 61:3), does not establish such entitlement. As the trial court
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appropriately noted. "Too bad she wasn't honest enough to [] get the best prescription
medication he could have given" (R. 77:19; Addendum E).
Second, defendant cannot show that "Dr. Dall would have continued to prescribe
Oxycontin even had he known of [defendant's] admitted misconduct of working under
an assumed name." Aplt. Br. at 25. In making that assertion, defendant relies on notes
from Dr. Dall dated May 16, 2000 responding to WCFs statement that it would no
longer pay for Oxycontin. Aplt. Br. at 35-36. In those notes. Dr. Dall states that "it is
my medical responsibility to provide appropriate treatment regardless of allegations
until those allegations are proven" and that if "indeed, [defendant] has been abusing my
prescriptions in terms of forging, selling, etc., then that would be a felony and I would
provide no further medication but would agree with the recommendation for drug detox"
(R. 48-49; Addendum D). Defendant claims that these notes show Dr. Dall would have
stopped prescribing Oxycontin "only if [defendant] 'has been abusing [his] prescriptions
in terms of forging, selling, etc/" Aplt. Br. at 25-26 (citing R. 48-49).
However, the doctor's notes do no such thing. Rather, they only indicate that Dr.
Dall would continue prescribing a medication until the allegations were proven, not that
he would necessarily continue prescribing Oxycontin. Indeed, Dr. DalPs willingness to
prescribe something other than Oxycontin is made clear on the very next page of the
record—Dr. Dall's notes dated May 31, 2000, in which he writes that "there is enough
evidence against her that prescribing controlled substances for this lady is not
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appropriate/* that defendant "understands my inability to prescribe controlled
substances," that WCF "has indicated [it] will pay for nonnarcotic medications/* and
that he has thus "written a prescription for that today" (R. 50: Addendum D).
Thus, the evidence before the trial court at sentencing established (1) that WCF
would not have paid for defendant's Oxycontin if it had known she was working;
(2) that Dr. Dall told WCF he would not have prescribed the Oxycontin if he had known
defendant was working; and (3) that, in light of defendant's conduct and WCF's
unwillingness to continue paying for Oxycontin, Dr. Dall stopped prescribing defendant
Oxycontin (R. 50; R. 61:3-4). This evidence was sufficient to establish that "but for"*
defendant's working under an assumed name and concealing her employment from
WCF, WCF would not have paid for and Dr. Dall would not have prescribed her
Oxycontin. See McBride, 940 P.2d at 544).
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
B.

The trial court did not consider the cost of methadone in
calculating the amount of restitution.

Defendant claims that the trial court improperly "determined that [she] owed
restitution for the cost of Oxycontin minus the cost of Methadone" because there was
insufficient evidence to establish "that Methadone was a proper medication in lieu of
Oxycontin," Aplt. Br. at 22-23. However, because the trial court never found that
methadone was a proper medication in lieu of Oxycontin. defendant's claim fails.
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Defendant's PSI stated "that while defendant. . . was receiving 514,647.00 in
WCF prescrition benefits for the prescribed Oxycontin, she was gainfully employed . . .
under [an] assumed name" (R. 61:2-3; Addendum B). The PSI then calculated
restitution costs for Oxycontin at $14, 377.56, "the cost difference between the
Oxycontin [defendant] received over an 18 month time period and Methadone [which]
is substantially cheaper to prescribe, and is considered a substitute medication for the
Oxycontin" (R. 61:7; R. 77:9).
At sentencing, defendant objected to the use of methadone as an off-set to the
cost of Oxycontin, arguing that "the formula of comparing Oxycontin to methadone is
based on [a] false premise" (R. 77:15; Addendum E). Defendant explained: "The state
is calculating this number based on the assumption of methadone which is a very low
cost drug would have been prescribed"; however, a note from Dr. Dall "says we started
her on methadone [and] [s]he had a severe skin rash" (R. 77:17; Addendum E).
In response to defendant's argument, the trial court stated: "Let's not offset the
methadone. Let's just have her pay for the medication she never should have obtained
. . . . If you don't want to have an offset for what it would have cost for methadone
that's fine with me" (R. 77:17; Addendum E). "I was wanting to deduct what they
would have been willing to prescribe. You told me not to do that, so that's okay. Let's
not do that" (R. 77:18; Addendum E). The trial court then ordered defendant to pay
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restitution in the amount of SI 4,647, the full amount that defendant received "in WCF
prescrition benefits for the prescribed Oxycontin" (R. 61:2; R. 92).
Because the trial court never found that "Methadone was a proper medication in
lieu of Oxycontin," Aplt. Br. at 22, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting such a finding fails.3
IV.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO CORRECT ALLEGED INACCURACIES IN HER PSI
IS INADEQUATELY BRIEF AND SHOULD NOT BE REACHED;
THE ONE ALLEGED OBJECTION IDENTIFIED IN HER BRIEF
DID NOT WARRANT TRIAL COURT ACTION.
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred because it did not make specific

findings on the record after [she] repeatedly objected to the contents of the [PSI] and
asked the court to correct mistakes in the report." Aplt. Br. at 28. However, only two

3

To the extent defendant's claim rests on a contention that the trial court should
have used some other medication as a substitute for Oxycontin rather than methadone,
that claim fails because any error was invited. This Court will not consider "can error
committed at trial when [the complaining] party led the trial court into committing the
error.,,, State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611, 617 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)). Here, defendant argued that methadone was not an
appropriate substitute for Oxycontin because it allegedly gave her a severe skin rash (R.
77:17). Accepting defendant's argument, the trial court decided not to offset the cost of
the Oxycontin with the cost of methadone (R. 17-18). Defendant neither objected to that
decision nor offered any evidence that a different medication was a more appropriate
substitute for Oxycontin than methadone. Thus, defendant invited any error caused by the
trial court's failure to consider other possible substitutes. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (holding defendant "cannot lead the court into error by failing to
object and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions"
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Betha, 957 P.2d at 617 (holding
defendant cannot complain on appeal where "it was defendant's counsel who requested
the court's ruling").
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alleged objections are identifiable from defendant's brief. Because the bases of her
remaining conclusory statements are unclear from the record, this Court should refuse to
consider them. The two bases identified in defendant's brief fail on the merits.
Section 77-18-l(6)(a) of the Utah Code provides that ~[a]ny alleged inaccuracies
in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and
the department [of corrections] prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of
the sentencing judge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999). The court may then
grant the parties "an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies."
Id. If the inaccuracies remain unresolved, "the court shall make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record." Id.
As the supreme court has held, this section "requires the sentencing judge to
consider the party's objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether
the information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that
information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, *[*[ 44-45,
973 P.2d 404; see also State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ^ 13, 6 P.3d 1133.
A.

Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed.

Under rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendant's brief
must contain an argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Thus, this Court " i s entitled to have the
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in
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which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research/*' State v.
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439.
450 (Utah 1988)) (additional citation omitted). Utah courts have consistently refused to
consider issues that have not been adequately briefed. See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d
299, 304-05 (Utah 1998); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); see also
MacKay v. Hardy, 913 P.2d 941, 947-49 (Utah 1998); Walker v. U.S. Gen.t Inc., 916
P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996); Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197. 198 (Utah App. 1996).
Here, defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to make specific
findings on the record after she "objected repeatedly to the [PSFs] inclusion of conduct
for which she was not convicted, did not plead guilty, and did not admit responsibility"
and objected "concerning the [PSFs] assumptions that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to
receive medical benefits, that Oxycontin would not have been prescribed based on her
admitted conduct, and that Methadone would have been prescribed in the absence of
fraud." Aplt. Br. at 30. Defendant then cites to various pages of the record. Aplt. Br. at
28 (citing to R. 77:7, 11-13, 17, 19-20); Aplt. Br. at 30 (citing to same). However, no
explicit objections to defendant's PSI appear on those pages. Thus, both the State and
this Court must guess as to what specific objections defendant now claims were made.
See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 150 (holding issues on appeal should be "clearly defined").
Consequently, this Court should refuse to consider this part of defendant's claim.
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B.

Because defendant never asked the trial court to correct her PSI
in connection with her attorney's alleged fraud, this claim is
waived; in any case, the challenged statements did not appear in
the PSI but, rather, in a different part of the record.

"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim
on appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1988). "One of the primary
reasons for [this rule] is to assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to address a
claim that it erred." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1992). Thus, "[t]he
objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error of which
counsel complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Otherwise, "that issue is not properly preserved for
appeal," State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993)).
Here, defendant claims that the trial court made "no specific findings" and "did
not even address" defense counsel's alleged claim that the PSI inaccurately portrayed
him as a participant in defendant's fraud. Aplt. Br. at 30. However, defendant never
specifically objected to the PSI's statements concerning her attorney's alleged conduct
and never specifically asked the trial court to make any correction thereto. Rather, as
defendant herself acknowledges in her brief, counsel stated only that "[t]here*s one
major correction or clarification and these the court needs to take notice of* (R. 77:7;
Addendum E) (emphasis added). Then, after explaining that clarification, counsel
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concluded by stating, "I mean it's obvious that those assertions are simply untrue in
regard to [defendant] and I" (R. 77:7; Addendum E). Nothing in counsel's statements
would have alerted the trial court that a correction to the PSI was requested. Thus, no
objection to the PSI was raised in a manner "specific enough to give the trial court
notice of the very error of which counsel complains." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 546: see also
Veveto, 2001 UT 62, ^j 15. 6 P.3d 1133 (noting defendant both raised his objections
before the trial court and presented evidence thereon): KohL 2000 UT 35. at«[ 34 (noting
defendant "objected" to the PSI and "[specifically" identified his claims).
Consequently this claim was waived.
In any case, it was not the PSI that contained the objectionable material. The PSI
states only that "defendant's attorney . . . sent a fax to WCF in early October consisting
of Court dockets from the current case" on which he had "circled only Counts Three and
Four . . . highlighting the fact these charges had been dismissed, and as a result WCF
should pay for the Oxycontin" (R. 61:6). Thus, the PSI does not necessarily suggest that
defense counsel had done anything improper. Rather, it was another part of the record,
a fax sheet from WCF to the prosecutor concerning defense counsel's fax, that
suggested defendant "is continuing the same fraud for which she plead guilty" and that
"[n]ow it would appear she has her public defender assisting her in this
misrepresentation" (R. 45). Because defendant's objection did not in fact involve the
PSI, neither section 77-18-l(6)(a) nor Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, apply.
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Consequently, defendant's claim on this basis fails.
C.

Defendant's objection to methadone as an Oxycontin substitute
was addressed by the trial court on the record.

Finally, defendant claims that the trial court failed to make findings concerning
the PSI's assumption "that [she] was lying when she said that she was allergic to
Methadone." Aplt. Br. at 30 (citing R. 77:17, 19-20; Addendum E). However, in fact
the trial court implicitly accepted defendant's contention that she was allergic to
methadone when it stated, "Let's not offset the methadone." (R. 77:17: Addendum E).
See Point III.B. supra. Although it is true that "[statements concerning the court's view
of the defendant and the case in general... do not fully meet the requirements of section
77-18-l(6)(a)," Jaegar, 1999 UT 1,1j 45, the trial court's statement here was not
"general" but rather specifically addressed defendant's claim, indicating its acceptance
of defendant's argument and its determination that whether defendant was able to take
methadone "[was] [irrelevant to the issue of sentencing." Id. at ^f 44.4
Consequently, defendant's claim on this basis also fails.

4

To the extent this Court determines the trial court's finding on this matter is
insufficient, "the proper remedy is to remand [the] case to the trial court with
instructions that it expressly resolve [the defendant's] objections in full compliance with
section 77-18-1 (60(a)." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT Mf 45, 973 P.2d 404.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court's
restitution order. If this Court concludes that additional findings concerning the PSFs
accuracy are required, this Court should remand the matter to the trial court for that
limited purpose.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 4^L January 2002.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-201

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c).
*
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil ppnalty
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
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(d) u) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
<e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of prdperty of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, $ 1; 1983, ch.
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1;
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch.
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19;
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995,
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch.
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 149,
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment by ch. Ill, effective May 1. 1995, added
u
or for conduct for which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement" and made a related change in Subsection (4)<a)(i).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection
(l)(d), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "person convicted" in Subsection i2), and added
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4XdXiii).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in
Subsection (4X0" at the end of Subsection
(IXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the criteria and procedures for ordering restitution;
added Subsection (8); and made several stylistic changes.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redesignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection
(2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc),
requiring sentencing to the aggravated mandatory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to
children during the commission of child kidnapping or various listed child sexual assaults.
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for
a
May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection
(2 Kg), which read: "on or after April 29, 1996, to
imprisonment at not less than five years and
which may be for life for an offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1
and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-

section i2)(h) as Subsection (2Kg); deleted
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective
April 29, 1996. in Subsection (2Kb) substituted
u
removal or disqualification from" for "removal
from or disqualification of" and in Subsection
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2."
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3,
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections
(4XaXvii) and (4XdXiv).
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998.
in Subsection (4)(aXi) substituted ^Subsection
(l)(e)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and
family member has the meaning as defined in
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the
style of the internal references in Subsections
(5XcXi), (5Hc)(ii), and (8Xc).
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999,
in Subsection (6Xe). substituted "aggravating
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission"
for "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" and made stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 301,
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this section, as" amended by ch. 301, as Subsection
(4XaXvib
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995;
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amendment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29,
1996.
Cross-References. — Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et
seq.
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq.
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 et seq.
Restitution as condition of probation, § 7718-1.
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule
22, R.Cnm.P.
Special release from city or county jail, purposes, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et
seq.
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule,
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Aggravating factors.
— Bodily injury to victim.
— Seventy of offense.
—Sufficient.

Arrest record.
— Effect on sentence.
Credit for pretrial detention.
Discretion of court.
Effect of noncompliance.
Informal procedure.
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77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
il) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
fii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department,
i c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
<d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection 13)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
< e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
14> Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.

'5) a; Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may. with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
<b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
<i) identify the victim of the offense;
<ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201< 4 >
by the defendant;
< iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
Uv) describe any change in the victims personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404.
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
»6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b> If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
<7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.

(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
Costs;
< iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-1120.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions,
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period
under Subsection (lOMaXi), there remains an unpaid balance
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the
payment of the account receivable.

<B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the
account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
uii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt
of court.
<b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable,
ill) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) u) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
lb) li) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.

(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14).
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim s authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim s household.
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.

ib» The department shall establish procedures and standards for nome
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection < 17).
17) i a> If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
ib> The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
ic) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
lii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
id) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
<i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
lii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
<e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.

Addendum B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EN EL TRIBUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTRITO
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE, ESTADO DE UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT,
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER
EL DOCUMENTO DECLARATORIO DEL
ACUSADO, LOS CERTIFICADOS DE LOS
ABOGADOS Y LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ

THE STATE OF UTAH,
EL ESTADO DE UTAH,
Plaintiff,
El Demandante,

CASE NO.

versus
contra

?<f/<?1/te</f$

N° DE CASO

Defendant
El Acusado

COMES NOW /jl/flf)

M/lf

r//)S.

ledges and certifies
tfUTfollowing:
acknowledges
COMPARECE
reconoce y certifica lo siguiente:

J» the defendant in this case, and hereby
^/
_, el acusado en este caso, y por este medio

I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime(s):
Me declaro culpable del siguiente delito(s):
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

DEGREE

EL DELITO Y LA DISPOSICION
ESTABLECIDA POR LA LEY

GRADO

PUNISHMENT
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
ELCASTIGO
Minimo, rnaximo y/o

Jr?/
tfftfen y~
c.

fa/hi:

6#s/?^

/ZffZFl*///&tf/i/n/rr<^:
8/99

I have received a copy of the Information against m e , ! have read it, and I understand the nature
and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading guilty.
He recibido una copia del Documento Acusatono, la he leido, y entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos
del delito(s) por el cual me declaro culpable.
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows:
Los elementos del delito(sY del cual se me acusa son los siguientes:

My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable that constitutes
the elements of the crime(s) charged is as follows:
Mi conducta y la conducta de otras personas por la cual soy pepalment^responsahk, y que^onstituye
los elementos del delito(s) imputado. es la siguiente:
, fjdJfn
W -/-f 'yT
" ^ 4 (^1L/
nlC/Jrh^

J>y <ff/cm/ a<nt?rf\t/) f?#4<4~<Xn «6f/ ,ke—7^ &£)/*</) 5&V7H ^fWT} m/>.

UWi^rS

I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the
following facts:
Doy entrada a esta declaracion(es) voluntariamente y con el conocimiento y el entendimiento de la
siguiente information:
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one,
an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a condition of my sentence
may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.
1. Se que tengo el derecho a ser representado por un abogado, y si no tengo los fondos para contratar
uno, el tribunal me asignara un abogado sin cobrarme. Reconozco que una condicion de mi pena puede ser que
se me requiera pagar una cantidad, determinada por el tribunal, para reembolsar el costo del abogado, si es que
se me asignara uno.
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have
done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:
2. (No he) (he) renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener un
abogado, lo he hecho a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente por las siguientes razones:
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3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand the nature
and elements of the charges, my rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of my
plea of guilty.
3. Si he renunciado al derecho a tener unabogado, he leidoeste documentoy entiendo lanaturaleza
y los elementos de los cargos, mis derechos en este caso y otros actos procesales, y las consecuencias de mi
declaracion de culpabilidad.
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / \ 2 @ v v ^ / ^
and I
have had an opportunity to fully discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty
plea with my attorney.
4. Si no he renunciado al derecho a tener un abogado, mi abogado es
,
y he tenido la oportunidad de hablar con mi abogado en detalle sobre este documento, mis derechos y las
consecuencias de mi declaracion de culpabilidad.
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open court by an impartial jury and that I am
giving up that right by pleading guilty.
5. Se que tengo el derecho a tener un juicio publico sin demora ante un jurado imparcial, y que al
declaraime culpable renuncio a ese derecho.
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to compel
my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court in my behalf. I understand that I am
giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
6. Se que si deseo tener un juicio, tengo el derecho a carear y repreguntar a los testigos en mi contra,
o hacer que mi abogado les repregunte. Tambien se que tengo el derecho a obligar a mis testigo(s), por medio
de un citatorio costeado por el Estado, a testificar a mi favor en el tribunal. Entiendo que al declararme culpable
renuncio a estos derechos.
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; but if I choose not to do so, I cannot
be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be drawn against
me if I do not testify. I understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
7.
Se que tengo el derecho a testificar a mi favor, pero si elijo no hacerlo, no se me puede obligar
a testificar o a dar pruebas en mi contra, y ninguna inferencia desfavorable se sacara en mi contra si no testifico.
Entiendo que al declararme culpable renuncio a estos derechos.
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and the
matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element
of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
8. Se que si deseo disputar la acusacion, solo necesito declararme inocente y el asunto se fijara para
un juicio. En el juicio el Estado de Utah tendra la obligation de probar cada elemento de la acusacion sin que
quepa duda razonable. Si el juicio es ante un jurado, el veredicto tiene que ser unanime.

-49. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the right of a presumption of innocence. I
understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if
this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption
of innocence if I plead guilty.
9. Entiendo que como acusado gozo del derecho a la presuncion de inocencia. Entiendo que se supone
que soy inocente hasta que el Estado pruebe en un juicio ante un jurado que soy culpable sin que quepa duda
razonable, o hasta que me declare culpable si decido no tener un juicio. Entiendo que renuncio al derecho a la
presuncion de inocencia si me declaro culpable.
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the
Judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or,
where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal,
those costs would be paid by the State-1 understand that I am giving up these rights if I plead guilty.
10. Se que bajo la Constitution de Utah, si el jurado o el Juez me enjuiciara y condenara, tendria el
derecho a apelar mi condena y pena en la Corte de Apelaciones de Utah o, donde se permita, en la Corte
Suprema de Utah, y si no tuviera los fondos para pagar por los gastos de tal apelacion, esos gastos los pagaria
el Estado. Entiendo que renuncio a estos derechos si me declaro culpable.
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I plead guilty.
I know that by pleading guilty to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentence
may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine, an
eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to
make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges
that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this plea agreement
11. Se cual es la pena maxima que se puede imponer por cada delito por el cual me declaro culpable.
Se que al declaranne culpable de un delito que lleva una pena minima obligatoria, me estare sometiendo a
cumplir esa pena minima obligatoria por ese delito. Se que las penas pueden ser consecutivas y pueden consistir
en una condena penitenciaria, una multa, o ambas. Se que ademas de una multa, se impondra un recargo de
ochenta y cinco por ciento (85%). Tambien se que el Juez me puede ordenar indemnizar a cualquier victima(s)
de mis delitos, incluyendo cualquier restitution que se deba en los cargos retirados como resultado de este
convenio declaratorio, si estos existieran.
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for an additional
amount if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12. Se que el encarcelamiento puede ser por periodos consecutivos, o la multa en una cantidad
adicional, si me declaro culpable de mas de un delito. Tambien se que si estoy bajo libertad condicional
probatoria ("probation"), o libertad preparatoria ("parole"), o esperando la imposition de la pena por otro delito
del cual he sido condenado o por el cual me he declarado culpable, mi declaration de culpabilidad en la presente
action puede resultar en que se me impongan penas consecutivas.
13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up my statutory
and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s),
I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13. Se y entiendo que al declaranne culpable renuncio a los derechos legales y constitucionales
enumerados en los parrafos anteriores. Tambien se que al dar entrada a tal declaracion(es), admito que he
cometido la conducta que se alega y que soy culpable del delito(s) por el cual se da entrada a mi declaracion(es).

-514, My plea(s) of guilty (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully
contained in this statement.
14. Mi declaration de culpabilidad (es) (no es) el resultado de un convenio declaratono entre el
abogado acusador y yo. Las promesas, obligaciones y estipulaciones de este convenio declaratono, si existen
algunas, se encuentran en su totalidad en este documento.
15. I kiiow and understand that any motion to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty must be for good
cause, in writing, and must be filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea.
15. Se y entiendo que cualquier petition para retirar mi declaracion(es) de culpabilidad ha de
interponerse dentro de treinta (30) dias despues de dar entrada a dicha declaracion(es), y esto ha de ser por
escrito, y debe existir causa justificada.
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession, or recommendation of probation or
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney, is not binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions
they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court
16. Se que el Juez no tiene que regirse por cualquier concesion de cargo o de pena, o recomendacion
de libertad conditional probatoria o pena suspendida, incluyendo una reduction de los cargos para la imposition
de la pena hecha o solicitada por el abogado defensor o el abogado acusador. Tambien se que el Juez tampoco
tiene que regirse por cualquier opinion que me expresen en cuanto a lo que ellos crean que pueda hacer el Juez.
17. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to plead
guilty, and no promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
17. No se me ha amenazado, coaccionado, o influenciado ilegalmente para inducirme a declararme
culpable, y no se me ha hecho ninguna promesa excepto las contenidas en este documento.
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement I do not
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct
18. He leido este documento, o mi abogado me lo ha leido, y entiendo sus estipulaciones. Se que
puedo cambiar o tachar cualquier cosa contenida en este documento. No deseo hacer ningiin cambio porque
todas las afirmaciones son correctas.
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
19. Estoy satisfecho con el asesoramiento y la ayuda de mi abogado.
20. I am
years of age; I have attended school through \X\d5£J/ grade; and I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my
judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any
drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment
20. Tengo
anos de edad, he asistido a la escuela hasta el
grado y puedo leer y entender
espanol. Si no entiendo ingles, se me ha proporcionado un interprete. No estaba bajo la influencia de ninguna
droga, medicamento o bebida alcoholica que pudiera perjudicar mi criterio cuando se tomo la decision de dar
entrada a la declaracion(es). Actualmente no estoy bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, medicamento o bebida
alcoholica que perjudique mi cnterio.

-621. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding the
proceedings and the consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that
would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
21.
Creo estar en sano juicio, con capacidad mental de entender los actos procesales y las
consecuencias de mi declaracion, y libre de cualquier enfermedad mental, defecto o impedimento que me
prevmiera dar entrada a mi declaracion a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente.
22.
22.

Other:
Anadido:

Dated this'
Fechado el dia

dayjfc^^/^^

199^ ^

del mes de

O^O

O

de 1999.

DEFENDANT
EL ACUSADO

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR
I certify that I am the attorney for
, the defendant above, and
that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated;
and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing
affidavit, are accurate and true.
Certifico que soy el abogado de
, el antedicho acusado(a), y se
que el (ella) ha leido el documento, 0 que se lo he leido yo, y lo he discutido con el (ella), y creo que entiende
el significado del contenido en su totalidad, y creo que esta mental y fisicamente competente. A mi leal saber
y entender, despues de una investigation apropiada, los elementos del delito(s) y la sinopsis factual de la
conducta delictiva del acusado estan estipulados correctamente, y estos, junto con las otras proclamaciones y
afirmaciones hechas por el acusado en el affidavit anterior, son certeros y verdaderos.

/Altorn^y for Defendant / Bar No.
El Abogado del Acusado / N° de Abogacia

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
EL CERTIFICADO DEL ABOGADO ACUSADOR
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's
criminal conduct which constitutes the offenses) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats,
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest
Certifico que soy el abogado del Estado de Utah en la causa en contra de
,
el acusado. He revisado este Documento Declaratorio del Acusado y encuentro que la base factual de la
conducta delictiva del acusado que constituye el delito es verdadera y correcta. No se le ha ofrecido al acusado
ningun incentivo inapropiado, amenaza o coaccion para alentar una declaration de culpabilidad. Las
negociaciones declaratorias se encuentran en su totalidad en el Documento y en el Convenio Declaratorio, o
como complemento en las actas del tribunal. Existe motivo fundado para creer que la prueba respaldaria la
condena del acusado por el delito(s) ante el cual se da entrada a la declaracion(es), y la aceptacion de esta
declaracion(es) beneficiaria a la ciudadania.

attorney J
>gado Acusador / N° de Abogacia

ORDER
LA ORDEN DEL JUEZ
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and
counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is freely and
voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that the defendant's piea(s) of guilty to the chargers) set forth in
the Statement be accepted and entered.
Basado en los hechos presentados en el Documento anterior y la certification del acusado y de los
abogados, el Juez atestigua las firmas y determina que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado se hace
libre y voluntariamente, y asi se ordena que la declaracion(es) de culpabilidad del acusado por el cargo(s)
expuesto en el Documento sea aceptada y asentada.

Dated this
Fechado el dia

5

day of
de

de 1999.

DISTRICT COURT
GE
El JUEZ DEL TRIB 'AL DEL DISTRITO

Addendum C

PRIVATE
FILED D i r
STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE?/ ^(y
REGION III OFFICE
*^~
36 West Fremont Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 239-2103

Deyoiy :

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
Date Due: 10-18-00
Sentencing Date: 10-23-00

JUDGE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
SALT LAKE
(CITY)

THIRD DISTRICT

SALT LAKE
(COUNTY)

COURT

UTAH

C. TODD ORGILL CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR

NAME: MARTINEZ, DYAN LYNN
ALIASES: DYAN STEWARD; DYAN
PIEMME
ADDRESS: 1410 W. 600 SO.
SLQUT 84104
BIRTHDATE: 08-18-58 AGE: 42
BIRTHPLACE: REDDING, CA
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH
MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED

COURT CASE NO: 991921564
OBSCIS NO: 141737
CO-DEFENDANTS: NONE
OFFENSE: WORKERS COMPENSATION FRAUD.
F2; ATT. POSS C/S W/ INTENT TO DIST., F3
PLEA: GUILTY DATE: 09-05-00
PROS. ATTORNEY: CLARK HARMS
DEF. ATTORNEY: RALPH DELLAPIANA
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PLEA BARGAIN:
The defendant was originally charged with Count One, Workers Compensation Insurance Fraud,
Second Degree Felony; Count Two, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute, Second Degree Felony; Count Three, Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Fraud,
Third Degree Felony; and Count Four, Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Fraud, Third Degree
Felony. Through plea negotiations, Count Two was amended to Attempted Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, Third Degree Felony, and Counts Three and Four
were dismissed. The defendant pled guilty to Count One as charged, and the amended Count
Two charge.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Court dockets and District Attorney file
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE:
On November 10, 1991, the defendant, Dyan Lynn Martinez ("Martinez"), was employed by
Olsen's Greenhouse Gardens, an insured of the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCF").
On November 11, 1991, defendant Martinez reported to her employer she had injured her back
the previous day (November 10, 1991), while moving a bench in the course of her employment.
On November 21, 1991, a claim was filed with WCF in the form of an Employers Initial Report
of Injury, which claim resulted in the payment by WCF of medical and lost wage benefits
totaling $123, 463.98, including three surgeries and lost wages compensation after each surgery.
On March 21, 1994, defendant Martinez represented to the Utah Industrial Commission she was
permanently totally disabled (PTD) as a result of the November 10, 1991 industrial injury. As
part of the Compensation Agreement, WCF agreed that medical expenses resulting from the
industrial injury would continue to be paid by WCF. Because of this agreement, WCF received
three bills from United Drugs from August 4, 1997 to March 4, 1999, listing prescriptions over
an extended period of time (six months to a year for each separate bill). The three bills totaled
$16,152.41. -A majority of the bill ($14,647.00) was for a single prescription drug, Oxycontin. an
opiate pain reliever, whicB is aka a schedule U controlled substance.
WCF Investigator Larry McDonald discovered that while defendant Martinez was receiving
$14,647.00 in WCF prescription benefits for the prescribed Oxycontin, she was gainfully
employed from February 27, 1996 to February of 1997, and from February, 1998 to September
29, 1998 by Salt Lake Community College (South Campus) Food Services, under the assumed
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (continued)
name of Deborah Lee Hardy, and an assumed Social Security Number of 560-13-1654 (which
had legitimately been issued to Linda Elain Berchard). During her terms of employment with
Salt Lake Community College, defendant Martinez worked between 25 to 30 hours per week in
the cafeteria. Defendant Martinez's supervisor; Kevin Doney, told WCF Investigator McDonald
that he observed no difficulty for defendant Martinez aka Hardy performing her assigned duties
which included lifting 20 pound buckets of ice at least twice a day, four to six hours of standing
as a cashier, and cooking. Defendant Martinez obtained Utah Identification Care #159923646 in
the name of Deborah Lee Hardy. Defendant Martinez omitted all reference to her gainful
employment in her communications with Dr. Dall and WCF claims adjuster Lorena Ericson.
On September 22, 1997, defendant Martinez represented to Dr. Joel T. Dall, M.D. and WCF that
because of continuing back pain, she was unable to function without continuous pain medication.
Dr. Dall prescribed Oxycontin. From September 22, 1997 through March 4, 1999, defendant
Martinez represented to Dr. Dall and WCF that her need for Oxycontin increased from 10 gm to
120 mg a day.
From September 22, 1997 through December 31, 1997, Dr. Dall intended to prescribe defendant
Martinez a total of 246 Oxycontin 10 mg pills. However, through artifice, scheme and fraud.
defendant Martinez was able to obtain actual prescriptions for 450 Oxycontin lOmg pills.
From January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1998, Dr. Dall intended to prescribe defendant
Martinez a total of 2160 Oxycontin 10 mg pills. However, through artifice, scheme and fraud
defendant Martinez was able to obtain actual prescriptions for 3600 Oxycontin lOmg pills, and
was able to obtain actual medications totaling 4410 Oxycontin lOmg pills. On November 17,
1998, Dr. Dall confronted defendant Martinez about her obtaining more Oxycontin than he
intended, and defendant Martinez misrepresented to him that she was really only getting 180
tablets. Contrary to Dr. Dall's instructions, defendant Martinez continued to obtain amounts of
Oxycontin far exceeding the amount Dr. Dall intended.
Special Agent Montefusco found two prescription bottles of Oxycontin, in the name of Martinez,
in the possession of Sundowners during the arrests and round-up of the Salt Lake City Chapter of
the Sundowner Motorcycle Club in January and February of 1999.
On March 1, 1999, Dr. Dall told WCF investigator McDonald that if he had known that
defendant Martinez was gainfully employed under an alias, or was receiving an average of
approximately 360 Oxycontin lOmg pills per month, he would not have prescribed Oxycontin for

PAGE 4
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
MARTINEZ, DYAN LYNN

OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (continued)
the defendant.
WCF reports that had they known of defendant Martinez's gainful employment under the
assumed name, her medical and prescription benefits would have been terminated, and no
Oxycontin would have been prescribed by Dr. Dall or paid for by WCF. The Oxycontin obtained
by defendant Martinez by means of false representations and omissions cost WCF $14,647.00.
On or about September 8, 1998, Richard (Blue) Knudsen and Defendant Dyan Lynn Martinez
engaged in conversation at, 17 South 800 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, during which Knudsen
stated to the Defendant, "Do you want dope? I'll bring you some dope tomorrow. I'll be able to
get you at least half... I could get at least a half gram...." The Defendant replied, "all right/'
On or about October 8, 1998, in a telephone conversation with Richard (Blue) Knudsen, over
telephone number (801) 363-4470, subscribed to 17 South 800 West, Salt lake City, Utah, the
Defendant stated, that she just got home and was calling to tell Knudsen that she is "pretty in
pink/' The Defendant asks Knudsen "either way you can swing it?" to which Knudsen replies in
the affirmative. The Defendant then states, "That would be great because I need to try and come
up with some cash for Cork, cause he needs some help on that, okay?" Knudsen again replied in
the affirmative.
The results of an investigation of over one year conducted by the FBI and the Salt Lake City
Police Department which revealed that both the Defendant and Knudsen uses, possess and
distribute the Schedule II controlled substance, Oxycontin.
Based upon FBI Special Agent Montefiisco's experience, training and belief, as well as upon the
results of this investigation, it was his opinion that the phrase "pretty in pink" specifically refers
to the possession of lOmg tablet of Oxycontin, and that the subject of the defendant's telephone
calls from September 8, 1998, to October 8, 1998 is and was the distribution of Oxycontin
(Oxycodone), a Schedule II controlled substance.
During the arrests of members of the Sundowners Motorcycle Club and their associates in late
January and early February of 1999, two of the persons arrested were in possession of
prescription bottles of Oxycontin, which had been prescribed to, and obtained by the Defendant.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
District Attorney file and Probable Cause Statement
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE:
"Jan 28, 1999 FBI arrested me for arranging to distribute along with Salt Lake City Sundowners
They stopped me and Mike Steward when we left the clubhouse. They wouldn't explain why
other than to say it was part of a bigger investigation. I was bailed out. Then arrested 24 hrs
later when I went to pick up my truck at the FBI Biding. I was reincarscerated on the same
charge that I was currently on bail on. They said they weren't interested in me but certain
members of the club. They asked me to testify against them in court and they would let me go. I
said no I had no knowledge of what they were talking about. So they threatened to file charges
of securities fraud, comp. fraud and anything else they could dig up, and they did. The fraud
charges stemmed from c96 when my first husband was alive. He was very sick and we couldn't
afford to pay for his necessary medication so after exhausting all avenues of possible assistance I
attempted to work part time under an alias but was fired for excessive absence. My first husband
was a Sundowner and died Jan 6, 1999 23 days before the arrests. I believe I made a bad choice
in trying to work but at the time my concern was for my husband of 21 yrs marriage. I didn't
want to see him die, unfortunately he did and everything has been a nightmare since.
/s/
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS:
There are no co-defendants in the current matter.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
District Attorney file

Dyan Martinez

"09-15-00M
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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT:
Larry C. McDonald, Investigator for the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah, stated since the
defendant served several months in a federal prison and was placed on Supervised Release
through the United States Probation Office, she has continued to try and obtain Oxycontin. Mr.
McDonald clarified that since the current casecame to fruition officials of WCF stated they
would not pay for any more Oxycontin in the future due to her extended abuse of the narcotic.
Despite this agreement, Mr. McDonald stated the defendant recently returned to Joel T. Dall,
M.D., and received yet another prescription for Oxycontin. Further, he noted Ms. Martinez has
repeatedly called the adjuster at WCF and indicated the criminal drug charges involving
Oxycontin had been dismissed, and as a result WCF should be obligated to pay for the
prescription medication. He noted the defendant's attorney, Ralph Dellapiana, also sent a fax to
WCF in early October consisting of Court dockets from the current case. In the Court dockets,
Mr. McDonald stated Mr. Dellapiana circled only Counts Three and Four of the current case
highlighting the fact these charges had been dismissed, and as a result WCF should pay for the
Oxycontin.
Mr. McDonald noted that an alternative to the Oxycontin is Methadone. He noted the defendant
claims she cannot take Methadone because she develops a rash. Mr. McDonald surmised that her
developing a rash is not the real reason she does not want Methadone. Instead, he surmised she
does not want Methadone because it has no street value, in contrast to the Oxycontin.
He noted the large amounts of Oxycontin obtained by the defendant in the past far exceeded one
persons dosage. He noted the only time such a large amount of Oxycontin is prescribed is when
the patient is a terminal cancer patient that is due to expire soon. Mr. McDonald stated he has no
doubts the defendant was distributing the Oxycontin to her associates.
Also of concern to Mr. McDonald was the fact Dr. Dall continues to prescribe the defendant
Oxycontin. He noted it is evident from Dr. Dall's own notes that he is accepting the defendant's
claim all drug charges pertaining to Oxycontin has been dismissed despite his ongoing contact
with WCF and the fact Ms. Martinez served several months in a federal prison.
Mr. McDonald recommended the defendant w4serve some time," and be required to enter a drug
rehabilitation program. He noted Ms. Martinez is abusing a system that is intended to protect
injured workers. Mr. McDonald stated this premise makes her behavior even more ^despicable."
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Contact with Larry McDonald of the WCF
RESTITUTION
COURT CASE #

COUNT #

VICTIM

AMOUNT

991921564

1

Worker's Compensation
Fund of Utah

$17,690.16

Comments:
The above figure includes $14,377.56 financial loss from fraud, $2,340.00 investigative costs,
$642.00 in surveillance, $180.00 administrative costs, $135.00 clerical costs, and $15.60 copying
costs. The $14,377.56 is the cost difference between the Oxycontin Ms. Martinez received over
an 18 month time period and Methadone. Per Mr. McDonald, the Methadone is substantially
cheaper to prescribe, and is considered a substitute medication for the Oxycontin.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Contact with Larry McDonald of the WCF
CUSTODY STATUS:
The defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on May 11, 1999, and was released on
December 17, 1999. Therefore, as of the October 23, 2000, sentencing date, Ms. Martinez has
served 220 days in jail. "
~
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Documentation provided by the Salt Lake County Jail
JUVENILE RECORD:
The defendant does not possess a history of Juvenile Court referrals in the State of Utah.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Utah State Juvenile Court records
ADULT RECORD:
DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

01-28-99

FBI - SLC, UT

Unlawful Dist. C/S

None Listed

02-03-99

FBI - SLC, UT

WAS Dist. / Offer /
Arrange to Dist.
Counterfeit C/S, Felony

Dismissed (991902495)

05-11-99

U.S. Marshall's
Service

WAS Insurance Fraud;
WAS Poss. C/S, Second
Degree Felony;
WAS Poss. C/S w/ Intent
to Dist., Third Degree
Felony

CURRENT OFFENSE

WAS Poss. Contraband by
Prisoner, Third Degree
Felony;

Convicted of Poss. Contraband
by Prisoner, Class A Misd., 90
days jail (991700477, Second
District Court, Farmington. UT)

WAS Agg. Assault, Third
Degree Felony

Dismissed (991908657)

Comments:
Although not listed on the rap sheets received by this investigator, the defendant was convicted
of Fraudulent Concealment of Employment, Felony (Social Security Fraud) in United States
District Court. She was ordered to serve 12 months in a Federal Prison, and placed on 36 months
supervised release through the United States Probation Office.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office rap sheet (SO# 234496), Utah Criminal History record (SID#
512753), Court dockets, the defendant, and contact with Eric Anderson of the United States
Probation Office
PENDING CASES:
It appears the defendant has no pending cases.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Court dockets
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY:
On April 24, 2000, the defendant was granted supervised release through the United States
Probation Office after pleading guilty to Fraudulent Conceal of Employment, Felony (Social
Security Fraud) in United States District Court. Although the specific conditions of her parole
agreement is not known, Eric Anderson of the United States Probation Office in Ogden, Utah
noted the defendant is "doing well." He indicated the defendant has completed mental health
treatment through ISAT, is making restitution payments as required, and has tested negative on
all urinalysis tests. Mr. Anderson stated he plans to be present for the sentencing scheduled on
October 23, 2000.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Contact with Eric Anderson of the United States Probation Office (1-801-625-5680, ext. 77)
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION:
oDyan Lynn Martinez was born in Redding, California on August 18, 1958. The defendant, and
her two older sisters, were raised in a middle economic environment by both natural parents.
Reportedly, the defendant's father was employed as an operating engineer, while her mother was
a teacher. Although the defendant described her childhood as "good," she noted her father was
physically abusive and an "asshole." Due to the continued problems she had with her father, she
left home at age 13 and lived with friends.. Thereafter, she never had contact with any of her
family again. At age 22, the defendant left California and moved to Utah where she has
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BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: (continued)
continued to reside. The defendant has not had any contact with her parents or siblings in nearly
30 years.
Currently, the defendant is residing with her husband, Mike Steward, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
MARITAL HISTORY
On August 12, 1978, the defendant married Mike Martinez in California. Mr. Martinez died on
January 6, 1999 of diabetes. Two children, currently ages 21 and 17, were born to this
relationship.
On August 17, 1999, the defendant married Mike Steward in Utah. They have remained married.
No children have been born to this relationship.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
EDUCATION:
The defendant withdrew from El Capitan High School, located in San Diego, California, during
the tenth grade. She withdrew from school prematurely because she was "working full-time."
Per the defendant, she obtained her GED while in a Carsell, Texas Federal Prison earlier this
year. At an unspecified time in the past, the defendant attended the Grossmont Junior College in
LaMesa, California for three semesters. Ms. Martinez entered Grossmont after lying about
obtaining her high school diploma. She did not express a desire to obtain additional schooling in
the future.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
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GANG AFFILIATIONS:
The defendant is not affiliated with any local gangs.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Salt Lake City Gang Area Project records
PHYSICAL HEALTH:
In 1991, the defendant injured her back while working. Specifically, the defendant suffered
herniated discs. Since the injury, the defendant has had four back surgeries. Currently, the
defendant is not ingesting any prescription medication. Ms. Martinez indicated she has been
prohibited from ingesting certain types of medication due to the nature of the current charges.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
MENTAL HEALTH:
The defendant described her current emotional health as "good." She acknowledged that after
being released from federal prison in April of the current year she went to ISAT for an
evaluation. After completing the evaluation, Ms. Martinez stated ISAT officials required she
attend four mental health sessions. Reportedly, she initiated the sessions on September 19, 2000.
She has never taken medication for emotional or psychiatric problems. Ms. Martinez has never
considered suicide, nor has she been physically or sexually abused in the past.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
The defendant
ALCOHOL HISTORY:
The defendant initially began using alcohol as a teenager. She denied ever abusing the
substance, and noted she has never receiving counseling for alcohol abuse. Currently, the
defendant rarely consumes alcohol. Reportedly, she has had approximately three beers since
April of the current year. Ms. Martinez did not express a desire to participate in alcohol abuse
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ALCOHOL HISTORY: (continued)
counseling at the current time. She denied being under the influence of alcohol at any time
during the commitment of the current offense.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
DRUG HISTORY:
The defendant used marijuana occasionally as a teenager. She denied using any other
substances, and has never received any therapy that addresses drug issues. Ms. Martinez did not
express a desire to participate in drug abuse counseling at the current time. She denied being
under the influence of any illicit drugs during the course of the present offense.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
The defendant's Social Security Number is 560-11-1456
EMPLOYER

WAGE

Olson's Greenhouse Unspecified

TITLE

START/END

REASON
FOR LEAVING

Grower

Nine years ago

Unspecified

Comments:
Reportedly, Olson's Greenhouse was the place of employment where she injured her back Ms
Martinez has not worked in nearly nine years.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
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FINANCIAL SITUATION:
The defendant receives $239 per month from Social Security, and $1,040 from Worker's
Compensation Fund of Utah. Her husband's gross month income is approximately $1,080.
Their monthly expenses, which include utilities ($300), food ($400), rent ($264), insurance
($54), restitution ($100), and storage ($108), amounts to $1,226. In 1988, the defendant filed
bankruptcy. Her only listed asset is a 1973 Ford truck worth $500. She has no assets.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
MILITARY RECORD:
The defendant has never been a member of the United States Armed Forces.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
COLLATERAL CONTACTS:
This investigator was unable to establish contact with the assigned prosecutor, Clark Harms,
prior to the date of dictation.
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:
Now appearing before the court for sentencing on the offense of Workers Compensation
Insurance Fraud, Second Degree Felony, and Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute, Third Degree Felony is Dyan Lynn Martinez, a 42 year old female.
Utah State Juvenile Court records failed to reveal any previous referrals. As an adult, the
defendant has been arrested two prior times and been convicted of one felonyand one
misdemeanor. Ms. Martinez served several months in^a Texas fe3eraTprisorTfor the felony
conviction, and has been on Supervised Release throttglrthe^United"States Probation Office since
April of the current year. She has no pending cases at the current time.
For an extended period of time the defendant abused a system established to assist individuals
hurt while on the job. Not only did she continue receiving payments from the Worker's
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY (continued)
Compensation Fund of Utah while working at the Salt Lake Community College, but she also
was able to distribute Oxycontin to her Sundowner associates by altering the prescription to
obtain large quantities of the drug. Not only is this conduct completely inappropriate and
deserved of jail time, but there have also been allegations she has recently contacted WCF on an
incessant basis claiming they should pay for the drug because all charges pertaining to the *
Oxycontin have been dismissed. Obviously, these claims are simply untrue as evidenced by the
defendant's guilty plea to Count Two of the current case.
Although the defendant denied having a substance abuse problem, this agency believes that
based upon the nature of the current offense, and the allegations she has continued to try and
obtain Oxycontin, it appears a substance abuse evaluation is warranted. If determined
appropriate as a result of the evaluation, the defendant should be required to participate in drug
treatment.

REPORT PREPARED BY,
C TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR

APPROVED,

KATMERINE SHEPHERD,
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
COURT SERVICES UNIT

AGENCY RECOMMENDATION
It is the recommendation of the Staff of Court Services, Adult Probation and Parole, the defendant be
granted supervised probation under the following conditions:
1.

The defendant serve 120 days in the Salt Lake County Jail with no credit for time served;

2.

The defendant pay a $400 fine, plus an 85% surcharge;

3.

The defendant pay a recoupment fee for the services of her Court appointed attorney;

4.

The defendant pay $17,690.16 restitution to Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah;

5.

The defendant obtain a substance abuse evaluation administered through an appropriate agency,
and comply with any treatment measures recommended thereafter;

6.

The defendant abide by all guidelines of the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah;

7.

The defendant abide by all conditions of her Supervised Release Agreement through the United
States Probation Office;

8.

The defendant ingest medications as prescribed by a licensed physician. These medications
should be approved by her assigned probation officer;

9.

The defendant use no alcohol or illicit drugs while on probation and not frequent establishments
where alcohol is the chief item of order;

10.

The defendant submit her person, auto, place of residence or any property under her control to
search for the detection of alcohol or drugs by the probation officer, and submit to drug testing at
the request of the probation officer;

11.

The defendant not frequent places where drugs are used or sold, not associate with persons
known to use non-prescribed controlled substances, and not obtain prescriptions for controlled
substances without prior knowledge of the probation officer.

REPORT PREPARED BY,
C. TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR
APPROVED,

u&

iTHERINE SHEPHERD,
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
COURT SERVICES UNIT

F0RM1
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT
These are guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the offender.
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS)

0
2
4
6
8

NONE
ONE
TWO
1
THREE
MORE THAN THREE

PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVCTIONS
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS)
(INCLUDES DUI & RECKLESS)
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC)

0
1
2
3
4

NONE
ONE
TWO TO FOUR
___
FIVE TO SEVEN
MORE THAN SEVEN

PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
(ADJUDICATIONS FOR OFFENSES THAT
WOULD HAVE BEEN FELONIES IF
COMMITTED BY AND ADULT)(THREE
MISDEMEANOR ADJUDICATIONS EQUAL
ONE FELONY ADJUDICATION)

0
1
2
3
4

NONE
ONE
TWO TO FOUR
_J>.
MORE THAN FOUR
SECURE PLACEMENT

SUPERVISION HISTORY
(ADULT OR JUVENILE)

0
1
2
3
4

NO PRIOR.SUPERVISION
PRIOR SUPERVISION
PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT
PRIOR REVOCATION
ACT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER CURRENT
SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE

SUPERVISION RISK
(ADULT OR JUVENILE)

0 NO ESCAPES IR ABSCONDINGS
1 FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFFENSE) OR
OUTSTANDING WARRANT
2 ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION
3 ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM
4 ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT

VIOLENCE HISTORY
(PRIOR JUVENILE OR ADULT CONVICTION
FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH INCLUDES USE
OF A WEAPON, PHYSICAL FORCE,
THREAT OF FORCE, OR SEXUAL ABUSE

0
1
2
3
4

NONE
MISDEMEANOR
3rd DEGREE FELONY
2nd DEGREE FELONY
1- DEGREE FELONY

WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT OFFENSE
(ONLY WHEN CURRENT CONVICTION
DOES NOT REFLECT WEAPON USE OR
WHEN STATUTORY ENHANCEMENT IS
NOT INVOLVED)

1
2
3
4
6

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
ACTUAL POSSESSION
DISPLAYED OR BRANDISHED
ACTUAL USE
INJURY CAUSED

TOTAL PLACEMENT SCORE:

CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS: 40% of the shorter sentence is to be
added to the full length of the longer sentence.
CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS: 10% of the shorter sentence is to be
added to the full length of the longer sentence.

PLEASE CIRCLE THE CORRECT CATEGORY

Matrix timeframes refer to imprisonment only. Refer to the categorization of offenses. Capitol offenses are not considered within the
context of the sentencing guidelines.
ACTIVE CONVICTIONS
CRIME CATEGORY
TIME
MOST SERIOUS
Worker's Compensation Insurance Fraud. F2
H
NEXT MOST SERIOUS
Att. Poss. C/S w/ Intent to Dtst. F3
!
OTHER
OTHER
OFFENDER NAME: Dvan Lvnn Martinez
DATE SCORED: 10-19-00
SCORER'S NAME: C. Todd Orqill

OFFENDER NAME. Dvan Lynn Martinez

DATE SCORED:

10-19-00

SCORER'S NAME: C. Todd Orqill

CRIME CATEGORY
A

B

1st Degree

2nd Degree

Murder

V
IV
III

I

D

Person

j

Death

E

F

G

H

1st Degree

2nd Degree

3rd Degree

2nd Degree

3rd Degree

Other

Person

Person

Other

Other

|

24 YRS

8 YRS

10 YRS

48MOS

84 MOS

60MOS

36 MOS

30 MOS

=22 YRS
E
c
O
(/>

7 YRS

9 YRS

42 MOS

78 MOS

48MOS

30MOS

24 MOS

Imprisonment
6 YRS

8 YRS

36MOS

72MOS

20 MOS

16 YRS

7 YRS

4 YRS

:.;,......

24 MOS
60MOS

20 MO

36MOS

^18 YRS
5
SYJto

1

Intermediate
Sanctions

§20YRS
o

II

Death

C

1st Degree I 3rd Degree

24MOS

18 MOS

Re
Pro
AMOS

10 MO

•16MOSJ 19MOS 1 Misdemeanors

Form 4
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(Use Form 3 also for Mandatory Imprisonment Sex Offender Sentences)
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the guidelines. Reference the page number of the presentence
investigation where the judge can find supportive information.
This list of aggravating and mitigating factors is non-exhaustive and illustrative only.
Aggravating Circumstances
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not an element of the offense.
PSI Page #
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct.
Multiple documented incidents of violence not resulting in conviction. (Requires court approved
stipulation)
Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior.
Victim was particularly vulnerable.
Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive.
Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity.
There were multiple charges or victims.
Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting.
Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest.
Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify as an high risk offender.
Offender was in position of authority over victim(s).
Other (specify)
Mitigating Circumstances

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm.
Offender acted under strong provocation.
There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to establish a defense.
Offender is young.
Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes.
Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration.
Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision.
Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family relationships.
Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents.
Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time.
Offender was less active participant in the crime.
All offenses were from a single criminal episode.
Offender has completed or has nearly completed payment of restitution.
Other (Specify)
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION

DAYS OF JAIL CREDIT

220 davs

GUIDELINE RECOMMENDATION
AP&P RECOMMENDATIONS

Probation

Probation

REASON FOR DEPARTURE

OFFENDER NAME: Dvan Lvnn Martinez

DATE SCORED: 10-19-00 SCORER'S NAME: C. Todd Orgiil
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JOEL T DALL, M.D.
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Dyan returns for followup. It has been about 14 months
since I last saw her. Unfortunately for her, she was taken
to jail and though she states that charges were dropped,
they kept her in jail for about one year. She just got out
a couple of weeks ago.
During her time, she was managed with Flexeril, Naprosyn and
occasional Percocet.
She presents at this time wishing to go back onto the
long-acting narcotics. The Oxycontin was very helpful but
as indicated earlier, that was part of the reason she was
jailed. We started her on Methadone and she had a severe
skin rash to that which did not clear as we had hoped with
the steroids.
After discussing our options, therefore, we have decided to
go with MS Contin and we will begin at 60 mg po b.i.d. based
on the fact that that was her Oxycontin dose. We will want
to see her back in two weeks to assess her response and
tolerance of the medication.

P:

At the same time, she needs to be on an anti-inflammatory.
She has done well with Relafen in the past but with the
development of the Cox 2 anti-inflammatories that are safer
and less expensive, I think it is best to go with a trial of
one of those. I have, therefore, given her samples of each
and when she comes back in two weeks, we will assess which
one was best and best tolerated.
Lastly, I should say that she does attest today that she is
taking no other medications or illicit drugs.
ADDENDUM: I received a" call from Lorena at Workers
Compensation. They are denying payment for her oxycontin
stating that because of the ongoing investigations regarding
her use of oxycontin they do not feel that it is necessary
treatment. She does not dispute the fact that the patient
needs treatment and that our only treatments available
(having exhausted physical therapy surgery, injection
therapy, etc.) is medications. She does not dispute the
fact that short-acting narcotic medications pose a much
greater risk for abuse but does not think that medications
should be approved pending the ongoing litigation. The fact
that the methadone was approved without hesitation but under
the same circumstances does concern me.
This patient has a suspected history of abuse of medications
chough I am unaware of any direct proof. Of course, as
indicated above, litigation is pending and until that time
all allegations are, in my mind, just allegations. I feel
that we are at greater risk for her abusing drugs if we
withhold them than if we provide something that has a verylow abuse potential, such as MS Contin. Certainly if she
knows of a way to abuse the morphine and MS Contin, that
would change my opinion but I am unaware of any at this
point in time.

The bottom line is that Workers Compensation will not pay
for medications. They are okay with the pool therapy. I
feel it my medical responsibility to provide appropriate
treatment regardless of allegations until those allegations
are proven. If, indeed, she has been abusing my
prescriptions in terms of forging, selling, etc., then that
would be a felony and I would provide no further medication
but would agree with the recommendation for drug detox.
JTD:dw

Martinez, Dyan L,
47561
5-31-2000 Joel T. Dall, M.D.
Dyan returns for follow-up. As I think I have indicated in my
previous charts, narcotic medications have been disallowed for this
lady. I have met with the FBI agent who indicates that there is
enough evidence against her that prescribing controlled substances
for this lady is not appropriate. This was explained to the
patient who was very understanding. She states that she had "role
call" yesterday and has a preliminary hearing on her drug related
charges on the 29th of June. Until things are cleared up one way
or the other, she understands my inability to prescribe controlled
substances,
She reports that the Vioxx and Celebrex were both helpful, Celebrex
more so. Lorena has indicated that she will pay for nonnarcotic
medications and so I have written a prescription for that today.
Also, she is to continue with her pool therapy.
Me will make no other changes at this time and I will see her back
in one month,
JTD/ga
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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2000, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
PROCEEDINGS.
THE BAILIFF:
THE COURT:

Call the Dyan Martinez case.
This is the time then set for

sentencing in the matter of State of Utah versus Dyan Lynn
Martinez. Looked at the —

this is two felony offenses, a

second degree felony, workers compensation fraud, and a third
degree felony, attempted possession with intent to
distribute.
Ms. Martinez' attorney, Mr. Dellapiana, is here
representing the accused in this case, and Mr. Clark Harms is
representing the State of Utah. Okay. Mr. Dellapiana.
MR. DELLAPIANA:

Judge, a couple of primary

issues I have with the agency recommendation and one is the
request for additional jail time or jail time at this point.
There's several reasons I think the court should consider in
considering our request to stay any additional jail time. The
first is that Ms. Martinez' criminal history places her in
the level one category, the lowest category, which indicates
that she should be on a regular probation.
About a week and a half ago I spoke with Ed
McConkie, the executive director of the Utah Sentencing
Commission came to our office for a presentation about the
sentencing guidelines, and he was asked whether it was the
commission's view if somebody in the regular probation

3

1

category was contemplated to be doing jail time, and his

2

statement was that, no, they assumed that somebody in the

3

regular probation category would be on straight street

4

supervision.

5

Certainly it's within the court's discretion to

6

impose additional jail despite that but I think it's an

7

important consideration.

8
9

The second reason is that as part of the same code
of conduct that resulted in the Count I in this case, the

10

workers compensation case, she was also prosecuted for social

11

security fraud for working under a false name during this

12

same time. As a result of that charge Ms. Martinez was

13

sentenced to serve 12 months in federal prison which she did

14

complete. And that's —

15

about.

16

so she knows what punishment is

In our view the cases, although not exactly

—

17

don't have the same exact elements are somewhat related and

18

—

19

time and knows what punishment —

20

criminal conduct and because the charges are somewhat related

21

I think the court ought to take that into account.

22

and both the fact that she served a substantial amount of
that punishment follows

She did some jail time in addition, another reason

23

—

in addition to the federal time she did some jail time

24

being held in State custody she wasn't given credit for in

25

the federal case. It's not a lot. It was —

according to her

federal probation officer, Eric Anderson, who's present, she
was in custody from April 1st of 1999 to April 25th of 2000.
And that's 12 months plus 24 days.

Apparently in the federal

time they give you 12 months, you do 12 months.

So it looks

like there was maybe 24 days that she did in State custody on
the state hold —

state detainer for this case that the

federal court's did not give her credit for. And that ought
to be taken into account.
Another reason that the court can probably
consider not imposing any additional jail is that she's
amenable —

she demonstrated that she's amenable to

supervision in her federal probation.

She checks in

regularly. She's subject to random urinalysis which have all
been clean. She completed a mental health evaluation and
follow-up sessions. She's paying restitution in regard to the
social security count at the rate of a hundred dollars a
month on a regular basis.
THE COURT:

How much was the fine for social

security?
MR. DELLAPIANA:
I have here.

$1,248 I believe is the number

Scheduled to have those payments completed at

the rate she's paying by April of 2001.
Another reason that the court ought to consider
not imposing additional jail is that she's never been on a
supervised probation before. It's my view that prior to being

5

incarcerated a person ought to have a chance at supervised
probation when they're —

and that's of course related to the

regular probation argument I was making based on her criminal
history.
Another reason, I don't know that this is one of
the more important reasons or not but it is one of the
mitigating factors on the —

in the —

in the sentencing

guidelines and that's the effect on the family or dependents
of Ms. Martinez. She has a 17 year old daughter who's
pregnant. She's due to deliver in January. She's considered
high risk because of her age and because it's her first
pregnancy. Her father, Dyan's husband, is deceased. The
details of that are referred to in the presentence report.
She —

Dyan drives her daughter to child birth

classes and medical appointments and is presently buying her
groceries and contributing to her household to the extent of
about $300 a month.
So those are reasons that the court ought to
consider not imposing jail. There's some —
that I'd like to address. One is —

two other areas

I'll describe as

corrections to the presentence report and the other is
restitution. I'm not sure if I want to go through — I
probably should go through page by page the presentence
report but there's two —

there's two —

well, let's do one

first.

6

There's one major correction or clarification and
these the court needs to take notice of, and that's that —
we raised that last time we were here for sentencing. That
has to do with the allegation that Ms. Martinez and I as her
attorney have in some way recently been trying to commit
fraud upon the Worker's Compensation Fund. Those allegations
relate to a fax that I sent to Worker's Compensation Fund
adjustor and to Dr. Dall, Workers Compensation doctor, that
had been treating Ms. Martinez for several years now in which
I indicated that the charges relating to distribution of
prescription medications were dismissed.
And for reasons which I don't know the —

the —

maybe it was because merely —

the mere reliance on the

docket of the court doesn't —

didn't provide enough clear

indication to a non-attorney, somebody who's not used to
dealing with those on a regular basis to where they could
understand that that's what happened. Certainly the Court's
the court's information is clear in that regard, the
amended information we pled to in the plea form, and because
of that it's —

I mean it's obvious that those assertions are

simply untrue in regard to Ms. Martinez and I.
THE COURT:
is then, Mr. Dellapiana.
MR. HARMS:
talk about restitution.

How much do you believe restitution
14,647?
Your Honor, I'll address that when I
There were a number of questions you
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asked last week I have the answers to.
THE COURT:

Okay. Great.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

Would you like me to address my

(inaudible) on restitution first?
THE COURT:
disagree with that —
MR. HARMS:

Let's let Mr. Harms and if you
(inaudible).
Your Honor, let me just limit my

comments right now to the restitution.
THE COURT:

Okay. Great.

MR. HARMS:

I spoke to Brent McDonald the

workers compensation fund and apparently up until 1995 the
law of the State of Utah was that once someone was determined
by the Industrial Commission to have been permanently fully
disabled that decision is irrevocable and cannot be reviewed.
In 1995 a person went to request petitions of the workers
compensation fund.

The legislature changed that law.

Ms. Martinez was declared permanently, totally
disabled prior to 1995, prior to the date of the legislation.
Consequently the State of Utah is bound by the law as it was
in place at the time of her award and determination of
eligibility. The State of Utah is prevented from any
reconsideration of that eligibility and is prevented from any
reconsideration of that award.
Consequently, despite the fact that she was
working Workers Compensation Fund would have had to pay for
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pain medicine. Had they known what they know they would have
prescribed a different prescription and the $14,377.56 is the
rate of difference between what she was prescribed and what
they would have prescribed had they known the true facts. The
law would have required them to prescribe, however, some form
of medication.

know?

THE COURT:

Even though she was working?

MR. HARMS:

Correct.

THE COURT:

And what is it that they did not

That she was —

that the prescription Oxycontin was

being distributed to Sundowners?
MR. HARMS:
know —

They didn't know that.

They didn't

specifically they didn't know how many pills she was

obtaining compared to how many she was prescribed. That
amount and that specific fact would have caused them to
prescribe something else because of the very notion of the
discrepancy.
If I can approach, Your Honor, it's —

this is the

same chart we've used throughout this prosecution.
Those are the prescriptions each —

the shaded

area is the number of pills obtained. The bold line that goes
horizontally across the bottom quarter of that page at the

—

about the 200 level, 180 level, that's the actual
prescription that she had authority to obtain and the rest of
the shaded area above that is the number of pills she
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1

actually obtained.

2

Given that fact they would have prescribed her

3

something that was nonaddictive without really going into

4

whether not or not she was addicted 02: not, without going

5

into whether or not she was giving the pills to somebody else

6

or not, that fact alone would have caused them to prescribe a

7

lesser alternative medication as opposed to the Oxycontin.

8
9

THE COURT:

Well, I'm just a little bit troubled

with the substituting one prescription for another. It seems

10

to me based on what you told me about her irrevocable

11

entitlement to prescription reimbursement payment through

12

workers compensation that her doctors prescribed 246 10

13

milligram pills. Through artifice, scheme and defraud she

14

obtained 450. Why isn't the restitution between the 246 and

15

450?

16

MR. HARMS:

I think because workers compensation

17

looked at this as a case where they still would have been

18

prescribing something. They would not have prescribed

19

Oxycontin as the (inaudible) of abuse of that specific drug.

20

Consequently they would have prescribed this other drug.

21

That's just how they looked at it. So that's where that

22

number of restitution comes from.

23

restitution, the difference between the 17690 and the 14377

24

are investigative costs, administrative costs, clerical and

25

copying costs involved in the investigation by workers comp

The rest of the

10

which I think are appropriate given her specific conviction
of workers compensation fraud.
THE COURT:

What was your clients conduct that

allowed the tablets to go from the 246 to 450? Was it a
simple change in prescription or what was it?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

Change in her prescription

based on her thirty day reviews and consultations with the
doctor who after discussing with her her course of treatment
prescribed the medications that she received.
THE COURT:

What did she do just make a pen and

ink change to the prescription?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

She didn't forge anything.

She

didn't change anything.
THE COURT:

What did she do?

MR. DELLAPIANA:

These are our —

judge our

position is that all the medications she was prescribed were
prescribed by the doctor after consultation. The entry of her
plea was that she was
THE COURT:

—
What's the artifice, scheme and

fraud to then obtain these pills.
MR. DELLAPIANA:

Well, the state is presenting

the charge in relation to the workers compensation fraud as
—

as a fraud to obtain medications. The —

Ms. Martinez admitted in her plea. She —

that's not what
she indicated that

she had misrepresented to the Workers Compensation Fund that
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1

she was not employed when in fact she was employed using a

2

false name and receiving employment payments and salary at

3

the same time she was receiving Workers Compensation payments

4

due to —

5

she was unable to work. She denies falsely obtaining

6

medications.

alleging or based on the prior determination that

7

THE COURT:

She used the assumed name?

8

MR. DELLAPIANA:

9

THE COURT:

What was the assumed name for?

10

MR. DELLAPIANA:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. DELLAPIANA:

13

receive —

14

Not for medications.

To

To what?
To work under a —

make money at the same time she was
THE COURT:

You work.

15

name.

16

conduct?

17

doing? Why use an assumed name?

19

THE COURT:

20

M S . MARTINEZ:

21

THE COURT:

What's she

When I was working?
Yes.
So that I --

I'll play the stupid one.

Okay, how

did the Oxycontin enter the Sundowners?

23

25

—

You don't use an assumed

She's working off social security.

MS. MARTINEZ:

24

to work and

Why do you have to use soft language to couch criminal

18

22

—

MR. DELLAPIANA:
bottles

Judge there were two

—
THE COURT:

What —

how did —

I understand

12

that.
MR. DELLAPIANA:
Sundowners including in the
THE COURT:

She spent time with the
—

It's hard for me to say this.

She

obtained this prescription she wasn't using, distributed it
through her husband to her former husband to the Sundowners,
is that right?
MR. DELLAPIANA:
THE COURT:

That is not right.

Okay.

MR. DELLAPIANA:
MS. MARTINEZ:
THE COURT:

How did it get there then?
She --

I left the bottle there.
You what?

MS. MARTINEZ:

When they arrested us I had my

prescription on me. And there was another bottle, an older
bottle that was empty that was in the club house that I left
there previously. And there was nothing illegal going on. I
mean, my husband was a member and I spent time down there. He
was a bar manager so we spent time down there.
THE COURT:

Okay.

What else do you have then?

What did you want to state say your bottom line figure, Mr.
Dellapiana?

What do you believe is the restitution?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

I want to hear the state's

figure if I could.
THE COURT:

They're with the —

the State's

taking the position that the restitution is $17,690 dollars,
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is that right?
MR. HARMS:

Yes, Your Honor.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

All right, Judge. We're

opposed to imposition of any restitution.

Let me state my

reasons. First, at least any of the proposed restitution.
First, the —

the salary, the overhead

investigation costs while I haven't seen any case law on
point I'm going to object to as being general overhead costs
that don't —

that don't produce any marginal additional cost

to the Workers Compensation fund.
employees.

These are salaried

They get paid either way. And that's —

the total

of that is $2,982 dollars involving investigation and
surveillance expenses. We're opposed to any order relating to
that amount.
In relation to the $14,377 that's described as
relating to the Oxycontin, first I'd note that charges
relating to the distribution of Oxycontin were dismissed. I
don't think restitution is therefore appropriate.
Second, the —

using that figure assumes that

she's not eligible for benefits for the payment of her
medications.

As even the state has admitted she's guaranteed

to be eligible for medical benefits by state law and by the
terms of her settlement agreement. So imposing that figure
assumes that she was never eligible for benefits.
Now, the reason that she is eligible for benefits
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is because they've been determined to be medically
appropriate. The —

in this —

there's two different points

in this. One, the formula of comparing Oxycontin to methadone
is based on the false premise that methadone would have
been —
THE COURT:

Mr. Dellapiana, we're going to have

to step this up a little.
MR. DELLAPIANA:
THE COURT:

Want me to go faster?

Boy that would be great.

Yeah, I've

got a huge calendar to do (inaudible) and we could have tried
this case quicker than I'm trying to sentence.
MR. DELLAPIANA:
THE COURT:

I doubt it, judge.

I've got to tell you, to describe

Ms. Martinez as sanction resistant would be a monumental
understatement. Let's focus just for a moment, there is some
deceit in all this that apparently Ms. Martinez wants to
acknowledge out of one side of her mouth but then not out of
the other.
The basis, frankly, for the restitution, Mr.
Dellapiana, is the statement of Dr. Dall who is, after all,
the person who writes the prescription, that had he known
that the defendant was gainfully employed under an alias or
was receiving an average of 360 Oxycontin pills per month he
would not have prescribed Oxycontin for the defendant.
Now it seems to me to be fairly elementary that
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while she has a statutory right to have payment by workers
compensation funds for prescription benefits that does not
ipso facto mean she has the right to be deceitful, to provide
false information, to obtain medicine that she otherwise
would not have obtained had she not engaged in her fraudulent
misrepresentative activity.
So, the legal basis for the restitution is that
she should not have, would not have received Oxycontin at all
had she been forthright and had she been not engaging in her
fraudulent activities. The doctor tells me through the
(inaudible) investigator that he would not have made the
prescription at all.

It is awfully disingenuous at this

point for her now to stand on the not withstanding the fact
that I'm deceitful and dishonest pay for it anyway.

That's

not going to happen.
So you might be able to have the Court of Appeals
do that but I'm not going to do the overhead expense. This is
not on her time.

I just want the dollar figure for her. The

out of pocket cost to workers compensation fund.
I've got to tell you this is so clear to me that
that's the right thing to do.

There is a factual basis for

that. The doctor said he would not have prescribed the
medication had he known all the circumstances. She hid it.
The person who's being disingenuous and dishonest doesn't get
now to ram it all down our throats. Okay?
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MR. DELLAPIANA:

Okay, judge, but I need to

state for the record a couple of details.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

Including statements from Dr.

Dall. One of them is about methadone. The state is
calculating this number based on the assumption of methadone
which is a very low cost drug would have been prescribed.
And in the presentence report the presentence investigator
assumes that when Ms. Martinez said that she couldn't use
methadone that she was lying to him.

And the only reason she

said that is because methadone has a lower street value and
she wanted to get something more expensive.
Here's what Dr. Joel Dall says. This is in a note
that's attached to the Workers Compensation Fund letter dated
May the 16th of this year wherein he says we started her on
methadone.

She had a severe skin rash.
THE COURT:

Let's not offset the methadone.

Let's just have her pay for the medication she never should
have obtained but for her lying, conniving, cheating
conduct.

If you don't want to have an offset for what it

would have cost for methadone that's fine with me.
Doctor Dall says he never would have given the
prescription had he known the truth.

Okay.

So let's just

find out what was the dollar figure that Workers Compensation
paid for the Oxycontin.

And I'm told that that is —

isn't
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that the 14,000 dollar figure? I was wanting to deduct what
they would have been willing to prescribe.
to do that, so that's okay.

You told me not

Let's not do that.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

The state can give you a

figure. I need to make a record and I'm not finished.
THE COURT:

Okay. Let me just tell you again I'm

not going to have the sentence include not her paying back
that which was essentially stolen.
MR. DELLAPIANA:
THE COURT:

The first two times.

Right. And she stole the

prescription by misrepresenting her status. I'm willing to
offset that —

offset what the state would have paid had they

known the truth.

If it's a different drug than the one that

was given, that's okay. So it's 14,647. Isn't that what Dr.
Dall's telling me he never would have prescribed had he known
the truth?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

I think even the state will say

that that's not the number.
THE COURT:

Okay.

The presentence report tells

me (inaudible) 14,607 was for a single prescription drug
Oxycontin (inaudible).
MR. DELLAPIANA:

All right. Can I continue for a

minute?
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

And, Judge, I know I'm here

18

every Monday,

I know it's a long calendar but this is kind

of an important issue and I don't have much more to add,
but -THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

I think I need to.

These are the reasons —

continue on the reasons

why restitution is not appropriate. At least not in the
amount that they're suggesting. Our position is Oxycontin was
the prescribed medication by the doctor based on his analysis
of Ms. Martinez' needs. Again quoting from his letter that's
attached to the document submitted by the Workers
Compensation Fund in which referring —

responding to the

Workers Compensation Fund adjuster's indication that they're
trying to deny payment for the Oxycontin.
He says it's because they do not —

they do not

feel that it is necessary treatment but, quote, she does not
dispute —

this is Larana, the Workers Compensation Fund

adjuster.

She does not dispute the fact that the patient

needs treatment and that our only treatments available having
exhausted physical therapy, surgery, four failed back
surgeries, injection therapy, et cetera, is medications.
And so, this is a doctor's view of based on his
medical expertise that Ms. Martinez needs medication.
THE COURT:

Too bad she wasn't honest enough to

the get the best prescription medication he could have given,
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don't you think?

Are you disputing he's telling me through

AP&P he would not have prescribed the Oxycontin had he known
the truth?
MR, DELLAPIANA:

Judge, the way I read that is

that in 20/20, or in hindsight at least he's saying, gee,
that's a lot of Oxycontin.

Maybe I was prescribing too much.

Certainly doesn't deny prescribing it and he's not
saying he would not have prescribed it. He certainly was
prescribing it based on his monthly meetings with Ms.
Martinez.
The final issue, Judge, is in relation to the
statute that requires the court take into consideration Ms.
Martinez' ability to pay in determining whether or not
restitution is appropriate at all, or whether it should be
complete or partial or nominal. Her financial resources are
described in the presentence report. She was —

she's on

permanent disability monthly payments. She has —

she

contributes to the care of her pregnant daughter. She is
paying restitution for the federal case. And has —
THE COURT:

She's paying a hundred dollars a

month, is that right?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

She —

her payments are a

hundred dollars a month.
THE COURT:

And when will that end?

MR. DELLAPIANA:

April.
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THE COURT:

April.

MR. DELLAPIANA:
THE COURT:

April of 2001.

Okay.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

And she has —

I'm not sure

how much but it's extremely limited funds. $1,040 a month she
receives from Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. And has
monthly expenses for of course utilities, food, rent,
restitution I already mentioned, and what she contributes.
THE COURT:

I read that.

That's in the

presentence report, isn't it?
MR. DELLAPIANA:
THE COURT:

It is.

Okay.

MR. DELLAPIANA:

And that's —

that's all I

have to say about restitution, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay. Mr. Harms.

MR. HARMS:

I ask you to follow the

recommendations of the presentence report, Your Honor. The
reason I feel jail's appropriate, this was a continuing
course of conduct by which Ms. Martinez defrauded the state.
While she may have been entitled to certain benefits had she
been honest with the Workers Compensation Fund those benefits
would have been reduced because she would have been employed.
Second of all, she obtained significant quantities
of a schedule two narcotic while she was working. If she was
in such pain that she needed that narcotic she wouldn't have
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been able to work and virtually she's able to work she
shouldn't have used that much narcotic.
With regard to the other reason I think jail
time's appropriate despite the fact that through discovery
Ms. Martinez was aware of everything in this presentence
report including the level of Oxycontin previously obtained
by her and the fact that Dr. Dall said he wouldn't have
prescribed that had he known she was working, she has since
pleading continued to try to obtain Oxycontin (inaudible).
I think that her course of conduct shows no
remorse and in fact (inaudible).

I'd ask for the 120 days in

jail.
With regard to the restitution, Your Honor, the
total amount paid by Workers Compensation Fund during the
time period when she was gainfully employed for Oxycontin
alone is $16,152.41. The 14,000 dollar figure is the offset.
The actual amount of Oxycontin again is $16,152.41.
With regard to terms and conditions of probation,
Your Honor, in addition to those specified in the AP&P
presentence report it's my request that she be prohibited
from any contact with any members of the Sundowners
organization or their associates or anyone (inaudible) state
or federal prosecution, a list to be provided to her
probation officer. That she be prohibited from obtaining any
prescription medication from any doctor without an express
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written prior approval of her probation officer, and that she
be prohibited while on probation from obtaining prescriptions
for Oxycontin, that she be prohibited from approaching Dr.
Dall who clearly is not without fault in this matter and can
not use Dr. Dall for (inaudible) during the time of
probation.
There's a significant list of other doctor's who
are well qualified.

I don't think we need to revisit this

issue.
Finally, Your Honor, it would be my request that
the court order restitution be paid in the amount of $400 a
month. She will be entitled to continue to receive her
thousand dollars from Workers Compensation Fund through the
State of Utah. That money will not be prohibited from coming
to her by this conviction. However, out of one side of her
mouth she says don't send me to jail.

I can't be punished

because my daughter is pregnant and I need to contribute to
her financial benefit.
On the other hand she says I'm too poor to pay for
restitution. I think the court can see through that and
impose the restitution amount that is fair. She's currently
married. She has money coming in from that source. I think
this has to be paid and the restitution (inaudible) while on
probation.

$300 a month will allow that to happen.
Finally, Your Honor, I'm somewhat offended that
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the defense in this case has sought to seek advisory opinions
regarding sentencing from those outside of the realm of the
courtroom.

Mr. McConkie wants to be judge and (inaudible).

I'd ask the court to impose sentence.
THE COURT:

Just so I understand your figures

Mr. Harms, the difference between the Oxycontin and some
other prescription whether it's methadone or whatever she
might have used had the deceit not been involved you said
14,000, but then you jump that up to 17,000.

Is there any

overhead expense?
MR. HARMS:
through my discovery —

No, Your Honor. What I did is added
while Mr. Dellapiana was speaking I

went through and added all the prescriptions filled by Dr.
Dall during this time period, only the time period she was
working, for schedule two narcotics. Those amounts equal a
total of 16,152.41.
The 14,377 figure in the presentence report is the
offset for not prescribing Oxycontin but prescribing
methadone.

It gets to the 17 thousand through investigation

costs incurred by the (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Let me say this about the

restitution. There are on occasion times that there is —
restitution often becomes recoupment in that there are
restitution investigation prosecution costs, whether there's
court ordered exams or whatever it is. It seems to me that

24

the issue of Ms. Martinez' lack of ability to pay that really
mutes that out. I'm not going to order any investigative or
overhead costs in this case. I think there are clearly cases
where that is appropriate.
Indeed it is —

This is not one of them.
given her disability and limited

income I think at this point we're really talking about
theoretical amounts.

In any event this is a civil standard

in terms of amounts of restitution, not a criminal standard.
I think it's clear to me that the state to a civil standard
has shown their entitlement to be approximately $16,000 but
given her disability and lack of ability to pay during the
period of probation I'm going to order a portion of that as
part of sentence in this case.
Before I pronounce sentence, Mr. Dellapiana, one
final question regarding the suggestion of the state
regarding no contact orders.

I presume that you're familiar

with the names that are on the list that he'll provide me.
Do you have any objection to any of that?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

Well, just as an extensive

potential list are these friends?
(Whereupon, a short discussion was held off the
record.)
MR. DELLAPIANA:
THE COURT:
MS. MARTINEZ:

Her husband and her son.

They belong to the Sundowners?
Not my son, no.

My husband does.
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My deceased husband and my husband both are members,
MR. HARMS:

It would not be our position that

there's no contact (inaudible) relatives.
THE COURT:

Okay. Mr. Dellapiana, any legal

reason why sentence should not be imposed?
MR. DELLAPIANA:

Not that I'm aware of, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay. It will be the judgment of the

court in this matter that on each of these two felony
matters, the second degree felony and the third degree
felony, Ms. Martinez, that you be ordered committed to the
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by
law on the second degree felony of not less than one or more
than 15 years.

On the third degree felony for not more than

five years.
I'm ordering that the prison sentences run
consecutive to each other.

However, at this time I will stay

the execution of the prison sentences and place you on
supervised probation to Adult Probation and Parole. And Mr.
Dellapiana and Mr. Harms I'm going to order a two year not a
three year probation on each of the two felony counts, but
order that probationary periods run consecutive to each other
so that the total period of probation for Ms. Martinez is a
48 month period of time.
As a condition of probation I'm ordering that she

26

pay the sum of $100 per month as and for restitution for the
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah commencing with the month
of April of 2001 and continue throughout the period of your
probation with Adult Probation and Parole.
I'm also ordering as a condition of probation that
you serve 60 days in the Salt Lake County jail. I'll order
your forthwith commitment for that. And you're further
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $400 inclusive, not
exclusive, of the restitution, together with the 100 dollar
attorney fee recoupment and that is to be paid with the
restitution figures through Adult Probation and Parole.
You are to abide by all of the terms and
conditions of supervised probation including no association
with members of the Sundowners Club other than your husband,
of course, or immediate family member. You are not to use any
alcoholic beverage, illicit drugs while on probation and Ms.
Martinez you are to have written approval of and disclosure
of any prescription medication that you may take. That would
need to be disclosed to and approved by your probation
officer.
You'll need to submit your person, place of
residence, any property in your control to a reasonable
search by a probation officer, submit to random drug testing
as requested by your probation officer. You are to obtain a
substance evaluation administered under the direction of AP&P
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and comply with any and all treatment measures recommended by
Adult Probation and Parole.
The State of Utah will prepare and present to your
probation officer and Mr. Dellapiana a list of persons with
whom you are to have no contact and I'll be happy to review
that if necessary. Happy is an over statement.

Willing to

review that, Mr. Dellapiana.
Obviously, Ms. Martinez, I'm not —

would not

allow AP&P to impinge upon bona fide family relations and
those kind of things.
I wonder if at some point, you know, the
Sundowners activity, the —

all the stuff that's brought

enough heartache to your life, I wonder why it is that you
hang on to that.

I ask that rhetorically and would just say

to you that while you're on probation not only do you have to
be in compliance with the law, but frankly the element of
perception, and you're not to associate with people who are
using drugs, the place where drugs are being used, and
euphemistically lets call that the club house as if that has
not historically been and if it is not a place of criminal
activity.
It's not a good thing for a person on probation to
take that kind of position.

I think it's way past time that

you be mature and appropriate in all of your activities in
your life particularly now while you're on a supervised
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probation.
I have a little concern with invading your
doctor/patient relationship with Dr. Dall. I would just add
editorially that I'm not so sure that was a marriage made in
heaven either, and if I had a medical practitioner that was
so cavalier in how he or she was prescribing medication I may
want to be involved with someone who was a little —

was way

more careful with my own health related issues.
Those are choices that you can make and I think at
this point it would be improper for me to or not necessary
for me to say that, but I will say this. If you decide to
deal with Dr. Dall and you know your medical (inaudible)
that's okay.

But let me underscore for you that taking any

prescribed medication without first having that disclosed by
and to Adult Probation and Parole, any kind of end run to try
to compel Workmen's Compensation Fund to pay for medication
because you requested can provide the information thatf s
going to violate your probation.
It would just seem to me that you ought to just
close the chapter in this —

close this unfortunate chapter.

I would personally not touch Oxy — whatever that is, if it
were free. And given the history that's had with you —
I would not deal with Dr. Dall. I would —

and

there are

certainly other better ways that you can receive pain
medication that is right, is less harmful, is not going to
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1

look bad, is not going to be in any way linked to drug usage

2

by the Sundowners Club House.

3

Does that make sense at all to you?

Again, I'm

4

not enjoining you from —

5

medical help you believe is in your best interest.

6

comply with probation at the same time.

7

use Dr. Dall, to the degree that you (inaudible) these old

8

issues I think you're just inviting problems in your

9

probation.

10
11
12
13
14

15 I

you can do whatever, get whatever
Just

To the degree you

Any questions you have, Ms. Martinez, or Mr.
Dellapiana?

Okay. Order your forthwith commitment.
Mr. Harms, let me give this back to you.

Thank

you, sir. Thank you. Nice job.
(Whereupon, court was held in recess at 10:11.)
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